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LIMITED WAR AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

Paul Thomas Gillcrist

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Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

BY

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in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree

of

MASTERS OF ARTS

AN ABSTRACT
of
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August, 1965
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IN REPLY TO

OF

LETTERS AND ARTICLES FROM THE

OF

1941 Thomas Jefferson

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ABSTRACT

It was the purpose of this paper to trace the development of the concept of limited war up to 1950, to discuss its development and application in Korea and Viet Nam and, finally, to discuss the concept as it is implemented in the foreign policy of the United States.

Limited war, as developed in an historical sense, requires the application of limited means to achieve limited objectives. Limited war, as a non-uniform historical phenomenon, adapts itself to the international political environment. U.S. limited war policy in Korea was a classic example of the limitation of means. U.S. limited war policy in Viet Nam, while in reality an effort to maintain a power position in Southeast Asia, has divorced itself from the concept of limited war by attaching unlimited means to limited ends.

The author has analyzed these politico-military phenomena in their relation to the foreign policy of the United States.

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to study the development of the concept of limited war in 1950, to discuss its development and application in theory and practice. It is, to discuss the concept as it is implemented in the foreign policy of the United States.

Limited war, as developed by an ideological concept, requires the application of limited means to achieve limited objectives. Limited war, as a non-military historical phenomenon, refers to the international political environment. The limited war policy in 1950 was a result of the transition of means. U.S. limited war policy in 1950, while in reality on a limited basis, was a result of the transition of means. U.S. limited war policy in 1950, while in reality on a limited basis, was a result of the transition of means. U.S. limited war policy in 1950, while in reality on a limited basis, was a result of the transition of means.

The author has analyzed these political-ideological phenomena in their relation to the foreign policy of the United States.

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INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the United States has been, and still is, to a large extent, conditioned by the attitudes of the American people towards the use of force. The unusual circumstances under which the United States developed as a nation, as well as the international environment within which she achieved great power status, have preconditioned these attitudes. U.S. policy vis-à-vis the use of force in foreign affairs has undergone numerous changes since the United States emerged on the political scene as an actor rather than an observer. Throughout this development, however, there existed, in U.S. foreign policy, certain continuing elements. Among these elements, or ingredients, the more important ones are: practical politics, economic necessity, ideology, and a sense of mission.

Prior to the Second World War, the limited use of force, or the threat of it, was a recurring theme of U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. The United States found it necessary to intervene in Western hemispheric affairs no less than thirty times from 1898 to the present. One intervention, in fact, lasted twelve years. As the status of the United States grew so also did its responsibilities. The United States, in its new position of power,

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the United States has been, and still is, to a large extent, conditioned by the attitude of the American people towards the use of force. The national circumstances under which the United States developed as a nation, as well as the international environment within which she achieved great power status, have preconditions which are reflected in U.S. policy vis-à-vis the use of force in foreign affairs. The American people have always been deeply concerned with the political issues of the United States as an actor in the world. Throughout this development, however, force has been, in U.S. foreign policy, a constant and recurring element. Among these elements, or ingredients, the most important ones are: political, economic, military, and a sense of mission.

Since the Second World War, the limited use of force, or the threat of it, has been a recurring theme of U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. The United States found it necessary to intervene in Western Hemisphere affairs no less than thirty times from 1900 to the present. The intervention, in fact, lasted twelve years. At the request of the United States government to also fill its responsibilities. The United States, in its own position as power,

found it less and less profitable to show its strength blatantly.¹

In the wake of the Second World War, the concept of the limited exercise of military power began to take on added importance in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The development of this concept has never been better typified than in the two selected case studies--Korea and Viet Nam. It is with this in mind that the concept of limited war is analyzed in this paper.

It is the purpose of this paper to trace the development of the concept of limited war up to 1950, to discuss its development and application in Korea and Viet Nam and, finally, to discuss the concept as it is implemented in the foreign policy of the United States.

The observation has been frequently made that nothing stultifies military thought so much as a victorious war, for innovation, then, must run the gamut of inertia legitimized by success.² This statement might well be taken as the key-stone for this paper. Post-World War II thinking in the United States conceptualized military posture in terms of the lessons thought to have been learned during the war.

¹"On Intervention" an editorial in The Washington Post, May 5, 1965.

²Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 22.

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¹"New Intervention" an editorial in The Washington
Post, Nov 2, 1962.

²Henry A. Kissinger, Foreign Weapons and Foreign
Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 12.

This politico-military misconception tended to crystallize American ideas of what our national security policy should be, at a moment in history when the dynamics of technological change were to require the greatest possible flexibility. World War II experiences taught us, so we thought, that the ultimate criterion for victory was the capacity to out-produce the enemy. This, in itself, was a fallacy which ignored the lessons of history, some of which were indelibly written into the record of the Second World War. In 1940, for example, superior doctrine enabled the Germans to defeat an Allied army, superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment, but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and the more effective massing of artillery (a better relationship between fire and movement) provided the basis for Napoleon's success. There are many more similar examples of victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine. The ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted, and to confront the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered, became a decisive factor in World War II. History had repeatedly shown this to be true. But the United States, having won ultimate victory in two world conflicts by out-producing the enemy, decided to equate military

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superiority with superiority in potential military capability and in superior technological skill.³

United States postwar concepts of strategic thought were shortly to be confronted with a disturbing phenomenon in Josef Stalin's 1946-1950 communist offensive. The phenomenon of limited military aggression was one toward which little or none of our strategic thinking had been oriented. It is this type of military activity, and the response to it, which is to be assayed in this paper. It is the evolution of this politico-military phenomenon which is to be studied in its relation to the foreign policy of the United States.

³Ibid., pp. 16-17.

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 in Soviet doctrine 1945-1955 communist offensive. The
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1945-1955, 1945-1955

CHAPTER I

THE LIMITATION OF WAR

The means whereby men limit the dimensions of warfare are numerous; the variations are infinite. Examples of limited war, in the past, reflect many different examples of the efforts of politicians to maintain armed conflict at a level of intensity which permits some degree of control and restraint. Despite the complexity of the subject, however, it is necessary to attempt at least to analyze the limitation of war in the light of some of its more basic variables.

Definition of Limited War

Before getting too deeply involved into the ramifications of the subject of limited war, a definition must be postulated. At first glance, a definition seemed to be the least of the problems presented by the consideration of the general topic of limited war. However, it was soon discovered that many self-appointed experts held different views regarding the definition of limited war. In a general sense, however, all these definitions contained the same basic ingredients. Through the course of history, limited war has acquired different aspects as a direct result of the changing political and technological milieu within which it was conducted.

THE LIMITATION OF WAR

The second theory was that the limitation of warfare was necessary; the limitations were limited, however, in the sense that, in the past, it had been necessary to limit the extent of political or military action as a result of internal or external conditions of control and restraint. During the history of the subject, however, it is necessary to attempt to limit in order to limit the flow of war in the light of some of its more basic principles.

Definition of Limited War

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A limited war, then, is a conflict, involving organized violence, in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight, to concrete, well-defined objectives. These objectives are restricted in two major respects:

1. They do not require the maximum military expenditure of force of which the antagonists are capable.
2. They are such that they can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement.

More often than not, a limited war involves two (or very few) contenders. The fighting is generally confined to a local geographic area and directed, usually, against selected targets, primarily of explicit military importance. The fighting itself places demands upon the belligerents which are less than the maximum of physical and human resources. The limited war, during its conduct, permits the economic, social, and political patterns of existence of the belligerents to continue without serious derogation.

From this definition, it can be noted that limited war is partly a matter of degree. That is, war's limitation, or lack of it, depends upon the scope of the objectives for which the belligerents fight and upon the dimensions of force they employ in order to achieve their own objectives and to deprive the enemy of his. Nevertheless, that degree makes a substantial difference. In practice, it is not

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1. They do not require the maximum military commitment of forces of which the antagonists are capable.
2. They are such that they can be accomplished in a negotiated settlement.

Once often cited, a limited war involves two very low conditions. The fighting is generally confined to a local geographic area and limited, usually, against selected targets, primarily of explicit military importance. The fighting itself places demands upon the belligerents which are less than the maximum of physical and human resources. The limited war, during the conduct, permits the economic, social, and political patterns of existence of the belligerents to continue without serious disruption.

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difficult to identify limited wars as distinct historical phenomena.

A cursory review of the history of warfare shows, however, that limited war is not a uniform phenomenon. Limitation can occur in many different ways. A war can be limited in some respects and not in others, depending upon its physical characteristics and the perspective of the opponents. Conceivably then, a war can be limited in geographic scope but virtually unlimited in the weapons used and the targets involved within the area of combat. On the other hand, a war can range over an extensive geographic area and involve a number of belligerents and yet, as in the Seven Years War (1756-1763), remain very limited in the scale of its battles. It should be noted, however, in this last example, that such a war would be highly unlikely in this present day and age of military technology, transportation, and communications. Furthermore, a war may be limited from the perspective of one of the belligerents and virtually unlimited in the view of the other. Thus, a war involving a limited commitment of the resources of two major powers within some peripheral strategic area, like the Korean peninsula, may be a matter of life and death to a third power that is unfortunate enough to inhabit the area of combat.¹

¹Robert E. Osgood, Limited War - The Challenge to

difficult to identify limited war as distinct historical phenomenon. A cursory review of the history of warfare shows, however, that limited war is not a unique phenomenon. Limitation on scope is many different ways. A war can be limited in some respects and not in others, depending upon the physical characteristics and the perceptions of the opponents. Consequently, there is no one limit in general. Some wars are virtually unlimited in the weapons used and the targets involved within the zone of combat. On the other hand, a war may have no technological significance at all and involve a number of battles and yet, as in the Seven Years War (1756-1763), remain very limited in the scale of its battles. It would be hard, however, in this last example, that even a war could be truly unlimited in this present day and age of military technology, transportation, and communication. Furthermore, a war may be limited from the perspective of one of the participants and virtually unlimited in the view of the other. Thus, a war involving a limited commitment of the resources of the major powers with some peripheral strategic aims, like the Korean Peninsula, may be a matter of life and death to a third power that is unfortunate enough to inhabit the area of combat.¹

¹Robert L. Osgood, Limited War - The Challenge to

Types of Limited War

The protected environment within which the United States developed, free from the machinations and interference of European power politics, had an unfortunate effect upon the American concept of limited war. Americans tend to consider limited war as an "aberration from the pure case," and, therefore, have paid little heed to its implications and its opportunities.² This fact is due, in a sense, to the way in which Americans have tended to legitimize the limited wars in which they have contended. Every war in which the United States has been engaged in the Western Hemisphere has been a limited war in the sense that it did not require the full mobilization of human and physical resources. However, the United States invariably justified them as expeditions, punitive or otherwise, and, consequently, they rarely entered into the national consciousness as part of the phenomena of limited war.

The controversy over limited war, which has raged since the Korean Intervention, has tended to confuse the issues because it has failed to distinguish between the various forms of limited war. In addition to the examples

American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 1-2.

²Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 117.

Types of limited war

The projected employment within the United States developed, from the mechanization and intensification of European power politics, and an emphasis placed upon the American concept of limited war. Americans used to consider limited war as an extension from the pure case, but, therefore, have paid little heed to its implications and its opportunities.¹ This fact is true in a sense, for the way in which Americans have tended to justify the limited war is that they have considered, "every war is within the United States has been waged in the Western Hemisphere has been a limited war in the sense that it did not require the full mobilization of human and physical resources. However, the United States inevitably justified them as regularized, limited in objectives, and, consequently, they rarely entered into the national consciousness as part of the phenomena of limited war.

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American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 1-2.

Henry A. Kissinger, Foreign Relations and American Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 11.

mentioned above, is the type of conflict in which there is a tremendous disparity between the protagonists. Whatever the objectives set by the great power, her expenditure of war effort would be minor. On the other hand, for the smaller contender, the conflict would, more than likely, be an all-out effort. A variation of this type of limited war would occur if the stronger belligerent were restrained from exerting its full potential by moral, political, or strategic considerations. Once again, the Korean Intervention can be cited as an example. Once the Chinese People's Republic became involved, her commitment probably involved close to her maximum feasible effort; whereas, for a number of reasons, the United States effort remained limited. Yet another type of limited war was engaged in by Russia and Japan in 1905, in which the Russian commitment was limited to the forces which could be supplied to the scene of action by a single-track railway. Finally, there can occur a limited conflict between two major powers which is kept from escalating by tacit agreement rather than through difficulties in technology or logistics.

Present Possibilities of Limited War

In the context of the present-day political milieu, there are four general categories which can be distinguished as possible types of limited war.

political power, in the type of conflict in which there is a
 considerable disparity between the participants. However, the
 conflict is not by the great power, the responsibility of war
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 limited conflict between two major powers which is kept from
 escalating by some agreement which limits the ability
 to use technology or technology.

Present possibilities of limited war

In the context of the present-day political situation,
 there are four general categories which can be distinguished
 as possible types of limited war.

The first type includes limited wars between secondary powers, such as India and Pakistan, regardless of whether or not they might involve the danger of major powers being drawn into the conflict.

The second type of limited war consists of those conflicts involving either the Western powers or the Communist bloc against countries which are clearly outmatched and under circumstances in which outside intervention is unlikely. An example of this type of conflict is the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, or perhaps U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo in 1965.

A third category of possible limited war is that between a major power and a secondary power which may involve the possibility of escalation as in the present case of Viet Nam. Whereas the U.S. air attacks in the spring and summer of 1965 were conducted under the guise of assistance to the independence of South Viet Nam, in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements, they could easily escalate into a general war between the Chinese People's Republic and North Viet Nam, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other.

A final category is the limited war between two major powers in a strategic peripheral area such as Southeast Asia. This is obviously the most dangerous situation. If however, a limited war could be kept limited in this last

The first type involves limited areas between countries, such as India and Pakistan, regardless of whether or not they might involve the danger of wider powers being drawn into the conflict.

The second type of limited war involves the possibility of wider powers being drawn into the conflict. This involves either the Western powers or the Communists. This type of war is usually initiated by one of the major powers in which outside intervention is not likely. An example of this type of conflict is the Sino-Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, or perhaps the Sino-Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

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A third category is the limited war between two major powers in a strategic potential area such as Germany. This is obviously the most dangerous situation. If, however, a limited war could be kept limited in this case

category, it could clearly be kept from escalating in the first three.³

Limiting War

The concept of limitation, in any conflict, presupposes three basic requirements:

1. The forces available for conducting limited war must be able to prevent the aggressor from creating a fait accompli.

2. These forces must be of a nature to convince clearly an aggressor that their use, while involving an increased risk of general war, is not necessarily an inevitable prelude to it.

3. These forces must be associated with a diplomacy which clearly conveys the idea that general war is not the sole response to aggression and that there is a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional surrender.⁴

The dilemma of massive retaliation will confront the West only when its limited war forces are clearly incapable of successfully resisting a limited aggression. If this situation were permitted to exist, aggression would be invited, blackmail would be encouraged, and the West would

³ Ibid., pp. 117-119.

⁴ Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 67.

category, it would clearly be more easily understood in the

first place.

Limiting the

The concept of limitation, in my context, has

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prelude to it.

3. These forces must be associated with a strategy

which clearly conveys the idea that general war is not the

sole response to aggression and that there is a willingness

to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional surrender.⁴

The dilemma of nuclear proliferation will confront the

world only when the limited war forces are clearly inadequate

of successfully containing a limited aggression. If this

situation were permitted to exist, aggression would be en-

couraged, although it would be discouraged, and the world would

⁴ Ibid., pp. 117-118.

find itself on the horns of a fearful dilemma--the choice between unqualified surrender or general war.

The nature of the application, of limited war forces to resist a probe, must be clearly associated with a diplomatic posture able to take advantage of pauses in military operations to negotiate a settlement. Therefore, if the issue is made to depend purely upon military considerations, any conflict is likely to expand, by degrees, into a general war.

How, then, can these three requirements be met? There are several arguments currently receiving support. One group indicates that a retaliatory force is also suitable for a limited war because of its ability to conduct either graduated retaliation or limited strategic warfare. Another group advocates a strategy of indirect retaliation designed to punish an aggressor, though not necessarily at the point of aggression. Still another group would rely upon guerrilla warfare. Finally, there is a school of thought built upon the concept of local defense.

These proposals all contain seeds of feasibility and are all intended to resist aggression short of general war. Each of them has uses in deterring aggression and providing alternatives to all-out war. However, the implications of each regarding diplomacy, strategy, and deterrence vary. It is intended to discuss each of these measures briefly.

That there is no room for a further discussion of this

between the two sides of the argument.

The nature of the application, as limited and narrow

to a single case, must be clearly established with a view

to the purpose of the application of the law in this

operation to establish a principle. Therefore, it is

clear that the law is not applied to a single case, but

any conflict is likely to arise, by degrees, into a general

law.

Now, then, our three requirements are met.

There are several arguments concerning receiving support.

One group believes that a voluntary force is also main-

tenance for a limited war because of its ability to command

other organized resistance or limited strategic warfare.

Another group advocates a strategy of indirect resistance

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is intended to discuss each of these measures briefly.

Limited Strategic War and Graduated Retaliation

The concepts of limited strategic war and graduated retaliation are based on the premise that the retaliatory force can be used for purposes other than general war. Limited strategic war seeks to resist aggression, by measures which are normally a prelude to general war, without making an irrevocable commitment to a showdown. In this type of war, an attempt would be made to achieve a military advantage but stopping somewhat short of an all-out blow. As an example, a hypothetical occupation of West Berlin might be responded to by the destruction of some portion of the Soviet air defense warning system or perhaps a distinct portion of its retaliatory force. Such a response, according to advocates of this line of thinking, would serve as a warning and also decrease Soviet invulnerability to an all-out attack. The combined effect of such a reply would be to lead to a restoration of the status quo.

The theory of graduated retaliation would be somewhat similar but would not strive for a military advantage. Instead, sufficient damage would be inflicted upon the enemy to cause him to desist. In case of an attack upon some peripheral strategic areas, for example, advocates of "graduated retaliation" would recommend an enunciated program of destruction against specified installations on a graduated basis until the enemy ceased the aggression.

Limiting Strategic War and Destroyed Retaliation

The concept of limited strategic war and graduated retaliation was based on the premise that the retaliatory force can be used in such a manner that the enemy would be unable to retaliate with nuclear weapons. By such a policy, the enemy would be forced to accept a position of strategic inferiority. In this type of war, an attempt would be made to achieve a military advantage but stopping short of an all-out blow. As an example, a hypothetical occupation of West Berlin might be regarded as the destruction of some portion of the Soviet air defense warning system or perhaps a disruption of its retaliatory force. Such a response, according to advocates of this line of thinking, would serve as a warning and also decrease Soviet invulnerability to an all-out attack. The combined effect of such a reply would be to lead to a restoration of the status quo.

The theory of graduated retaliation would be somewhat similar but would not strive for a military advantage. Instead, sufficient damage would be inflicted upon the enemy to cause him to desist. In case of an attack upon some political strategic center, for example, destruction of "graduated retaliation" would represent an immediate program of destruction against specified locations on a graduated basis until the enemy ceased the aggression.

The weak point, in this line of action, is the difficulty in conveying to an enemy the fact that this response was, in fact, graduated retaliation and not the prelude to a general war. If the desire is conveyed to establish some limit to this sort of retaliation, the threat of a general war may lose some of its credibility. On the other hand, if the intent to limit the employment of retaliatory force is not correctly communicated to the enemy, a preemptive attack by him would seem inevitable. In short, the threat of limited strategic war or graduated retaliation is either too credible or not credible enough.⁵

The concept of the use of nuclear weapons, in various limited degrees and programs as a response to any form of aggression, began to lose what credibility it had as the Soviet Union approached a situation of nuclear parity with the United States. The concept devolved from a general desire in the United States to replace American lives with technological superiority on the battlefield. About the time the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological parity, at least in the field of missile boosters and delivery systems, the value of this line of thinking became suspect. Vestiges of this line of thought still retain active adherence in the application of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war as a means of off-setting a marked enemy

⁵Ibid., pp. 68-69.

The main point, in this line of action, is the ability to respond to an enemy who has this response, in fact, guaranteed retaliation and the ability to a general war. If the issue is conveyed to a general war, it is this point of retaliation, the course of a general war may lose some of its credibility. On the other hand, it is the intent to limit the employment of retaliatory force is not directly communicated to the enemy; a guarantee attack by the world is inevitable. In short, the intent of the great strategic use of guaranteed retaliation is within the limits of not violating the enemy's ability.

The concept of the use of nuclear weapons, in various limited degrees and programs as a response to any form of aggression, began to lose what credibility it had as the Soviet Union approached a situation of nuclear parity with the United States. The concept derived from a general desire in the United States to regain American lives with technological superiority on the battlefield. After the time the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological parity, as there is the field of nuclear power and delivery systems, the value of this line of thinking became suspect. Vestiges of this line of thought still remain active when used in the application of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war as a means of deterring a nuclear attack.

superiority in ground forces as might occur in a large-scale ground action in Western Europe or Korea.

Indirect Retaliation

Those who advocate a strategy of indirect retaliation address themselves to a basic dilemma of U.S. strategy. On the one hand, it is considered too risky to launch any sort of attack upon the communist homeland. On the other hand, it is impossible to defend, effectively, a twenty thousand mile perimeter drawn around this homeland. Adherents of indirect retaliation advocate a response calculated in severity to match the gravity of the aggression but involving measures such as blockades and economic sanctions, utilizing U.S. superiority in sea power, for example, to force a withdrawal of enemy units without resorting to an overt act of war. Unfortunately, a strategy of indirect retaliation would be an invitation to blackmail by reducing the risk to a potential aggressor. A strategy based entirely upon indirect retaliation must lead eventually to a disintegration of the free world.⁶

Guerrilla Warfare

Many thoughtful analysts, concluding that any major power conflict, however limited, would lead eventually to

⁶Ibid., pp. 72-73.

the unacceptable risk of a general nuclear war, advocate the organization, on a massive scale, of a guerrilla warfare capability in all free world states, but especially in those areas peripheral to the communist homeland. This capability, it is thought, would present a potential aggressor with an insuperable problem of pacification. Unfortunately, there is little historical evidence to support the theory that such resistance would be effective in a communist-controlled state. Even if this form of resistance were potentially effective, it would not in any way constitute deterrence. Partisan activity has been most effective in primitive societies and in those geographical areas particularly suited to this form of resistance. Partisan warfare can make an important contribution to other forms of resistance, but it cannot be substituted for them.

Local Defense

A capacity for local defense is essential to align deterrent policy with the strategy for fighting a limited war in satisfying the requirements for U.S. security and that of its allies. Local defense with ground forces involves attempts to deny to the aggressor the territory which he is seeking to gain, by direct ground defense of the local area. This strategy could be implemented by indigenous forces with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This strategy would ultimately seek to deter aggression

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by presenting an adequate local defense force capable of effectively defending a particular piece of territory.

There may be some cases, however, in which the United States fights a war for goals which do not require victory in the local encounter. There may also be areas in the world where the United States is incapable of winning a local war or would not want to fight in one. But with those points in mind, it remains true, as Kaufmann has stated, that

. . . despite what may be a comparative disadvantage in manpower, the United States should still be able, with the aid of indigenous forces, with mobility, well-organized logistical facilities, great conventional firepower, and highly trained conventional reserves, not merely to match, but actually to beat the enemy at this type of game. After all, Greece and Korea are not figments of the imagination.⁷

Indigenous forces are an important part of a ground war effort virtually anywhere in the world. Although they may be necessarily small, well-trained and well-equipped, indigenous forces can provide the crucial functions of triggering U.S. intervention and serving as a holding action sufficiently long for U.S. intervention to be timely and effective.

But perhaps more important, indigenous forces would provide a vital element of discrimination in the fighting of local wars. If indigenous forces are capable and competent,

⁷William W. Kaufmann, "Limited War," in William W. Kaufmann (ed.), Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1956), pp. 102-136.

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¹William W. Kaufmann, "Delayed War," in William W.
Kaufmann (ed.), Military Policy and National Security (Pace-
town: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 102-110.

they provide a means for American intervention in the form of supplies, technicians, training, and so forth which is much less blatant and overt, much less likely to lead to escalation and to political repercussions than the direct use of American troops. This was the case in the Taiwan Straits in 1958 and in Viet Nam in 1961-1963. Legalistic differences, such as those between intervention with supplies and equipment, and intervention with troops, are an important factor in the process of limiting war.

The ability to make use of this element, when it is in the best interests of the United States to do so, may, in some circumstances, be crucial.⁸

⁸Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 123-124.

that results in a need for constant intervention in the form of subsidies, subsidies, subsidies, and so forth which is more than almost any other, more than likely to lead to a situation not so much of a situation as the almost total of constant trouble. This was the case in the United States in 1954 and in 1955-1956, especially in the case of the intervention with troops, and an important factor in the process of finding out.

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Robert M. Johnson, Director, United States Office of Foreign Affairs, New York, May 1954, pp. 111-112.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED WAR

It is felt that there are certain lessons to be derived from history in shaping an approach to the concept of limited war, in the context of present-day international politics. One of the first steps in this brief historical review, however, is to make a very careful and important distinction. This distinction must be drawn between the general rules for conducting war, which belligerents are theoretically free to follow or ignore, at their own risks, and the obvious features of the international environment which evolve from a complex sequence of factors in such a way as to be beyond the power of the states to affect. Of the general rules necessary for the limitation of war, two basic ones should be considered for this historical survey:

1. The belligerents must be prepared to conduct war in accordance with well-defined limited political objectives susceptible to accommodation.
2. The belligerents must be prepared to limit the means used in achieving these objectives so that the means of war will be proportional to the ends.¹

¹Robert E. Osgood, Limited War--The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 61-62.

It is true that there are certain aspects to be
 carried over which are already in existence in the country
 of limited war, in the context of present-day international
 politics. One of the first steps in this case is to
 review, however, in order to make a very careful and accurate
 distinction. This distinction must be drawn between the
 general rules for modernized war, which will be the
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 the general rules necessary for the limitation of war, two
 basic ones should be considered for this historical survey.
 1. The principle that the purpose of modern war
 is to achieve with well-defined limited political objectives
 a permanent or semi-permanent

of war will be detrimental to the cause.¹

1. James E. O'Connell, United Nations
Human Rights Commission, University of Chicago Press,
1957, pp. 81-82.

The history of war demonstrates an interaction between the objectives and the scale of intensity of a war. The greater the value that belligerents attach to certain objectives, the greater the dimension of force they will be prepared to exert to achieve them. The greater the scale and intensity, the less susceptible will the objectives be to accommodation. At the same time, the consequences will be less subject to control and prediction. Therefore, although the deliberate delimitation of political objectives is a necessary ingredient to limited war, the advances in weapons technology and thus applicable physical force have made the rational control of war increasingly difficult. Despite the interaction between means and ends, the ends are more fundamental in providing a guiding political decision to pursue limited objectives. Even the most rudimentary means can lead to unlimited war when the ends are not limited. Osgood points out rather incisively that "Rome did not need nuclear weapons to destroy Carthage."²

Two periods of modern Western history stand out as predominantly periods of limited war: the period from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the French Revolutionary War, and the period from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I. During both of these periods,

²Ibid.

[illegible]

statesmen were constrained to fight for well-defined and well-limited reasons of state which generally possessed the following characteristics:

1. They did not incite extreme aspirations or fears.
2. They demanded something less than the maximum exercise of force.
3. They could be accommodated in a settlement before military destruction got out of hand.

The typical limited war in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries was fought to gain marginal adjustments in the balance-of-power which were not achievable through normal diplomatic intercourse. The objectives were varied. They included the acquisition of a particular piece of territory, the dynastic authority or succession in a state, trade relations between countries, or the exploitation of foreign markets, land or resources. Regardless of the objectives at stake, it is noteworthy that all these wars followed the same sequence:

1. They were customarily accommodated in a negotiated settlement.
2. The sting of defeat was usually soothed by compensations taken from weaker states or carved out of overseas empires.

The limited value of the objectives at stake relieved

the statesmen of the necessity of waging war to the utmost physical limits.

The period from 1721 to 1740 was the longest period of European peace between the Religious Wars and the Congress of Vienna. There was no general war during the one hundred year period between the Congress of Vienna and World War I; and only during the seventeen years from 1854 to 1871 did major world powers fight one another. The distinguishing feature of the two periods 1648 to 1792 and 1815 to 1914 is not the low incidence of warfare. Far from it! It was the relative moderation of the intensity of war compared to its ferocity during other adjacent periods, notably the Religious Wars of the 16th and 17th centuries and the "period of total war" in the 20th century.

It is true that, even in the 18th century, during which warfare was generally conducted with a higher degree of constraint than any other period of modern civilization, there were some exceptions. Some of the dynastic wars of Louis XIV, which did not end until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714, were as savage and devastating as the struggles in the Germanies during the Religious Wars. The pitched battles of the 18th century, though not so frequent as in previous centuries, were exceedingly bloody. The three partitions of Poland were virtually unlimited wars, at least from the Polish standpoint. On the whole, however, 18th century

the statement of the necessity of having war in the world
physical factor.

The period from 1811 to 1740 was the longest period
of European peace between the religious wars and the Com-
munist wars. There was no general war during the com-
munist war period between the conquest of Vienna and world
war I and only during the seven years from 1824 to 1871
did Europe have a few small wars. The religious
war period of the two periods 1840 to 1740 and 1871 to 1914
is not the longest of western war from 1811. It was
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of peace" in the 18th century.

It is true that, even in the 18th century, during which
warfare was generally conducted with a higher degree of com-
parative peace and order than in modern civilization, there
were some religious wars. One of the religious wars of 1811,
XIV, which did not end until the Treaty of Vienna in 1714,
was the longest and most devastating in the history of the
continent during the religious wars. The religious wars of
the 18th century, though not as frequent as in previous cen-
turies, were increasingly bloody. The three religious wars
of 1811 were particularly bloody and at least from the
religious standpoint. On the whole, however, the century

warfare was a formal, mechanical, and almost decorous operation.

The tactics of war were like a game of chess. The ultimate goal might be the capture of a fortress; but the game was often decided almost bloodlessly, by a skillful maneuver into a superior position. To surrender a fortress with honor, after a minimum of destruction and in accordance with certain conventional formalities, was a highly developed art.

The measure of military effectiveness was not the amount of destruction of enemy forces. Precision was more valued than sheer force. Ingenuity was more prized than zeal. Thus, pitched battles were rare and often indecisive.

Eighteenth century warfare was conducted so as to interfere with the lives of the civilian population--especially the merchants--as little as possible and to conserve and protect the hired soldier as much as possible. Thus, the burning and sacking of villages and farms, so common during the Religious Wars, was rare in the 18th century. Furthermore, military operations were confined, generally, to half the calendar year to avoid the rigors of winter campaigns.

Obviously, all these "house rules" set severe limitations upon military efficiency. Yet they were well adapted to the limited purposes for which they were employed. Most

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important, by affording the civilian population a unique freedom from the devastation of war, they gave maximum scope to the peaceful pursuits which were the real measure of man's progress in this era.

Limited wars in the 19th century were a far cry from the prosaic contests of the previous century. The physical potentialities for destruction forever ended the cumbersome tactics of maneuver and position which were the trademark of 18th century warfare. Nonetheless, in their extent and in their impact upon the material, social, and economic foundations of society, these wars were significantly restricted. This is especially true in comparison to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which preceded them. The Crimean War (1853-1856), the Austro-Sardinian War (1859), the war of Prussia and Russia against Denmark (1864), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Russo-Turkish War (1877), the Spanish-American War (1898), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Boer War (1899-1902), and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)--all these, except the last, involved major European powers; yet, they were all relatively short, local contests which caused little disruption of society and were settled by an accommodation of limited objectives. Only one war in this period equaled the Napoleonic Wars in its physical dimensions and in the magnitude of the objectives at stake, and that was

the American Civil War (1861-1865) which was fought outside the mainstream of world politics.³

It can be concluded, therefore, that both in their objectives and in their physical characteristics, the wars of 1648-1792 and 1815-1914 were predominantly limited wars. There were important economic, social and cultural factors which help account for this limitation, but primarily limited warfare was a reflection of the ends of war and of the means available for the achievement of those ends.

The wars, of the 18th century, were limited for a variety of reasons, among which are the primitive instruments of destruction and the cumbersome tactics which their technical deficiencies forced upon the combatants. The primary limitation, however, was purely one of economics. Eighteenth century armies were extremely expensive to maintain in relation to the resources available to operate them. The resources and manpower which were available for states to call upon were very limited. Thus, the training and tactics of armies in this period were tailored to the requirements of rigid maneuver and position, which precluded the kind of long-range movements, destructive pursuit, and rapid exploitation which characterized the wars of vastly increased scale and intensity in the 19th century. Hans

³Osgood, op. cit., pp. 61-65.

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total mobilization which characterized the wars of nearly

all modern wars and especially in the 19th century.

Speier concludes that, during this period, the military expenditures of France, Russia, and England amounted to more than two-thirds of their total budget.⁴

Despite the record of monumental blunders and incompetence of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, one suspects that the conflict did not blossom into full-scale general European war mainly because the belligerents could not draw upon those resources which were available in 1914. By the same token, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 might not have remained so limited if the combatants had not discontinued operations from sheer exhaustion.

The economic and technological limitations to war gradually began to disappear during the period from 1815 to 1914, even though the military potential was not fully exploited. This was the period when the industrial revolution swept the continent of Europe. It was this development which underlay the advent of total war. By 1914, the multiplication of goods and resources provided nations with a war potential unimagined by 18th century statesmen. The availability of vast quantities of fuel, metal, and rapid transportation virtually removed the limitations which, heretofore, had impeded the effective use of the instruments of

⁴Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War (New York: Steward, 1952), p. 241.

war. A second and associated factor of change was the rapid advance in technology. The perfection of the breech-loading rifle, the percussion cartridge, the machine gun and rifled artillery of greater range and accuracy created unprecedented potentialities for destruction.

Unfortunately, the existence or absence of limited war in any particular period of history cannot be fully explained in terms of economics and technology. One must also point to the factors of mass conscription and mass enthusiasm which were, in turn, the products of novel political and ideological goals.⁵

Historically, there has been no greater stimulus to unlimited war than the injection of highly-charged ideological and emotional issues and hostilities, for these kinds of issues incite and sanction an exercise of force to the utmost physical limits for ends which cannot readily be compromised.⁶

In this sense, the Religious Wars were unlimited wars, being primarily the products of the religious passions of the Reformation. Although the struggle between faiths was intermingled with the conflict of dynastic ambitions in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), it was ideological conflict that fed the flames which devastated the Germanies. One historian, in his history of this period, concludes that

⁵Osgood, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

⁶Ibid.

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 nationalism, in the history of this period, concludes that

² Ibid., pp. 211, 22-23.

losses sustained were about one third of the total population.⁷

On balance, the Religious Wars were a somber reflection of a phenomenon which was to recur in our present era. Ideological differences, when submitted to the judgment of the sword, tend to produce unlimited violence. Unlimited ends lead to unlimited means.

The wars of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic period sprang from intense emotional and moral issues, which militated against the careful political limitation of war. It is small wonder, then, that the French Revolution brought to a close Europe's greatest period of limited war. Once it was realized that popular sentiment could be utilized for state purposes, a vast untapped source of military power became available to statesmen who were able to stir national pride and appeal to universal moral principles. The democratization of war reached its culmination in the vast conscript armies of the turn of the century and was the basis for the total wars of the 20th century. The radical currents of the French Revolution, by making war a mass effort instead of the sport of kings, the business of mercenaries, and the last resort of social outcasts, ended by revolutionizing war.

⁷C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 516.

The interaction between means and ends is traceable in the post-Napoleonic era. The increase of the means available when added to the influence of Napoleon on military thinking, set the stage for the advent of total war. A long period of peace followed, from 1815 to 1854, during which the European political system was restored and statesmen once more absorbed themselves in the intricacies of the balance-of-power system. Ironically, the one state upon which the democratization of war had a real impact was Prussia, the most militaristic state in Europe. Prussia, in 1814, adopted the system of universal military service. Prussia's quick and overwhelming victories in her wars with Austria (1866) and with France (1870-1871) had a pronounced effect upon European statesmen. Soon, Austria (in 1868), France (in 1872), Russia (in 1874), and Italy (in 1875) followed Prussia's initiative.⁸

Despite the organization of military potential on a much larger scale, the 19th century remained a period of limited warfare. The basic reason for this lay in the political philosophy of the leader of the most powerful state in Europe. Bismarck played the game of politics in the spirit of the aristocratic school of diplomacy of

⁸Guy S. Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1922), pp. 122-123.

Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, although he may have lacked their sense of a transcendent European Community, united by common moral premises. Bismarck recognized the interdependence of politics and force and frequently, ignoring the advice of his military advisers who would have him press war beyond the limits of political expedience, pressed instead for quick and moderate settlements. Bismarck's sense of the political limits of force was perhaps the major contribution to the limitation of war in his era.⁹ Despite this contribution, it must be noted that his settlement of the Franco-Prussian War struck a serious blow at the European balance-of-power and augured a fundamental change in the whole conception of war and politics. This war recalled to European statesmen a lesson forgotten since the defeat of Napoleon. Simply stated, this lesson was that military power, organized on a mass basis, and supported by a nation's total resources, not only could gain small pieces of territory as a basis for negotiation but could win a lightning victory and impose a decisive peace upon a nation which had lost not only its will, but also its power to resist.

This lesson was not lost on Marshal Foch, who in 1918 became the leader of the Allied armies in the first war to fulfill the terrible potential of the nation-in-arms

⁹Osgood, op. cit., p. 72.

system. Foch proclaimed the absolute conception of war by stating:

The old systems of war, seeking to spare the armed forces, tried to achieve their objectives by stratagems, threat, negotiation, maneuver, partial action, occupation of territory and the capture of fortified places. Since Napoleon, war is conducted without regard to wastage; it recognizes only one argument: force. Not until the enemy has been crushed in battle and annihilated in pursuit is there any question of parley with him.¹⁰

Foch was abandoning the entire concept of limited war and urging a return to the absolute wars exemplified by Napoleon and described by Clausewitz. Into Foch's words, one reads the antithesis of the very idea of war as a rational instrument of foreign policy. His words exemplified an irrational fascination with the sheer destructive potentialities of total war as an instrument of ideology. Foch's concept of war contains the idea of the fatal interaction between means and extreme ends which was to drive war beyond the limits of rational control and prediction in the period of total war which opened in 1914.¹¹

Summary of Limited War up to 1914

The limited objectives of warfare in the 18th century

¹⁰ Ferdinand Foch, "De la Conduite de la Guerre," cited by Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde, 1793-1939 (New York: Putnams, 1940), p. 45.

¹¹ Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, trans, J. de Morinni (New York: H. K. Fly, 1918), p. 27.

sprang directly from the prevailing international political system, the balance-of-power. In accordance with this system, a dozen or so major states of roughly comparable power allied, separated, and allied again in ever-shifting combinations in order to prevent any single power or coalition from gaining preponderance and thereby threatening the common interest of all powers in maintaining a relatively stable international order. The central purpose of the system was the establishment of certain rules of the game by which all states might pursue their ends without jeopardizing the political independence of any of its members. The important feature was that the system put a premium on rationality, moderation, circumspection, and adherence to the rules. The balance-of-power system did not prevent war. Indeed, it would have been miraculous if three hundred or more sovereign states had been able to adjust their differences by peaceful means alone. However, the system did moderate the nature of the issues that led to war and, therefore, the objectives for which wars were fought. In the 18th century, then, war was truly a continuation of political intercourse.¹²

Before the 19th century had passed, the democratization of society, so greatly accelerated by the French

¹²Osgood, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

system directly from the prevailing international political system, the balance-of-power. In accordance with this system, a power or an actor stands as roughly comparable power allied, opposed, and allied again in corresponding combinations in order to preserve any single power as stable from internal disintegration and thereby threatening the security interest of all powers in maintaining a relatively stable international order. The central purpose of the system was the establishment of certain rules of the game by which all states might pursue their ends without jeopardizing the political independence of any of its members. The important feature was that the system put a premium on territoriality, sovereignty, international law, and international relations. The balance-of-power system did not prevent war. Indeed, it would have been unthinkable to have standing or non-standing states and been able to adjust their differences by peaceful means alone. However, the system did not make the maintenance of the balance of power an end in itself, the objectives for which were fought. In the century, then, that was truly a continuation of political internationalism.¹¹

Before the 19th century had passed, the democratic-ism of society, as greatly facilitated by the French

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 215-216.

Revolution, had destroyed the social system which had permitted the conduct of politics in nearly complete indifference to mass sentiment. There were growing signs, also, that diplomacy, regardless of how shrewd and circumspect, could not by itself preserve a stable international order in the absence of a broader system of social and moral restraints. The political system, itself, underwent changes that seriously weakened those restraints it had imposed upon national ambitions and the struggle for power.

Even more disruptive of the European balance-of-power system was the emergence of the great new industrial powers--Germany, the United States, and Japan; for this augured the end of Great Britain's role as the balancer of the international political system.

And so it came about that, with the deterioration of these political, social, and moral restraints which had previously facilitated the limitation of the ends and means of war, the 20th century began with an increasingly intense competition for military strength. This competition itself rendered the limitation of war more and more dependent upon the scrupulous restriction of military means at a time when nations were increasingly disinclined to practice forbearance.¹³

¹³Ibid., pp. 77-87.

Revolution, and democracy for social system had been
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An Age of Total War

The outbreak of general war in 1914 is often said to have presaged an age of total war. The outbreak of a second general war in 1939 seems to have convinced the world that the art of warfare, as practiced prior to 1914, had forever ended. The injection of ideology into both world wars by the United States changed their complexions from the normal power-political context to that of total war, total defeat, and unconditional surrender. No more was war fought in accordance with Clausewitz' dictum. No more did it have definite purpose, reasonable limits, or negotiable objectives. It demanded the elimination of the enemy's ability to resist rather than his desire to do so.¹⁴

In actual fact, the two world wars might better be considered aberrations from the general course of the history of warfare. The world was paying the price for involving the Americans in the game of European power politics. A review of recent history shows that no less than eight limited wars were begun in the year that marked the end of World War I. In addition, the Russian Civil War was still in progress. Of these eight wars, the Polish-Russian War, the Russo-Finnish War, and the Teschen Conflict between

¹⁴Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 112-118.

the subject of general war in 1911 is often said to have appeared in age of total war. The outbreak of a second world war in 1912 seems to have confirmed the world that the end of history, as foretold by 1911, had become closer. The injection of democracy into world wars by the United States changed their complexion from the usual power-political contests to that of total war, total defeat, and international terrorism. In war was war fought in accordance with Christian principles. No one did it have political purpose, economic limits, or negative objectives. It demanded the abolition of the enemy's ability to resist rather than his defeat as an end.

In actual fact, the two world wars might better be considered extensions from the general course of the history of nations. The world was trying for order for liberty of nations. The world was trying for order for liberty of nations in the face of European power politics. A review of recent history shows that in 1911 was right. Nations were made before in the year that marked the end of world war I. In addition, the Russian Civil war was still in progress. Of these eight wars, the 1911-1912 war, the Russo-Turkish war, the Russo-Turkish war, and the Russo-Turkish war.

14. Charles E. Leland, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 211-212.

Poland and Czechoslovakia all ended in 1920. The Anglo-Irish Conflict continued until 1921 and the Vilna dispute between Poland and Lithuania lasted until 1922, as did the Greco-Turkish dispute. The Riffian War, fought by the Moroccans against Spain and France, as well as the Chinese Civil War, both continued through 1926. Fourteen more limited wars were fought before the outbreak of World War II once more ushered in a general conflict:

- Costa Rican-Panama Conflict (1920-1921)
- Corfu Incident (1922-1923)
- Greco-Bulgarian Conflict (1925)
- Druse Insurrection (1925-1927)
- Sandino Insurrection (Nicaragua 1925-1934)
- Bolivian-Paraguay Dispute (1928-1930)
- Japanese Occupation of Manchuria (1931-1933)
- Letitia Dispute (Colombia vs. Peru 1932-1935)
- Chaco War (Bolivia vs. Paraguay 1932-1936)
- Italian-Ethiopian War (1935-1937)
- Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)
- Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)
- Russo-Japanese Conflict (Manchuria and Siberian border incidents 1938-1939)
- Russo-Finnish War (1939-1941)¹⁵

In the classical nation-state system, armed force was the "ultima ratio regii," the final argument a state could use to achieve its objectives. Force could be applied in ways and amounts graduated to the importance of the objectives and the level of resistance encountered. The new theory of inter-state conflict, however, made such discrimination unnecessary since the object of the conflict was the complete capitulation of the enemy.

¹⁵Army Magazine, VII, 1955.

Thus, a political system designed to be balanced by force became transformed into one in which force might destroy peoples and cultures but could not win politically relevant objectives. A huge and expensive effort was made by the greatest alliance in history to achieve an empty objective of unconditional surrender. From 1939 to 1945, war and politics had finally become separated.¹⁶

Limited war once again emerged while the ashes of the Second World War were still hot. In the same year World War II ended, four limited wars broke out. The Indonesian War lasted through 1947. The Chinese Civil War finally ended in 1949. Both the war in Indo-China and the Communist Guerrilla Warfare in Malaya lasted until 1954. The year 1946 saw the outbreak of Communist Guerrilla activity in Greece. The Kashmir Dispute, between India and Pakistan, was fought from 1947 to 1949. The Arab-Israeli War broke out in 1948 and ended in 1949. Finally, the year 1950 saw the beginning of hostilities in Korea which were to involve the efforts of two major powers, which were to have a pronounced effect upon American foreign policy and which were to establish the great power status of the Chinese People's Republic.

¹⁶Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War and After (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 5-6.

That, a political system designed to be balanced by
 good means themselves into one in which force might
 destroy justice and culture the world has not politically
 enjoyed anywhere. A hope and aspiration which was made
 by the greatest nations in history to achieve an unity
 objective of universalism. From 1919 to 1945,
 war and politics had finally become separated.¹⁰
 World war once again erupted while the nations of the
 second world war were still hot. In the year world war
 II ended, four hundred were killed. The Indonesian War
 lasted through 1947. The Chinese Civil War finally ended in
 1949. With the war in Indo-China and the Communist Revolution
 in Korea lasting until 1954. The year 1945 was the
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 hostilities in Korea when war to destroy the efforts of
 the United States, which were to have a permanent effect
 upon American foreign policy and which were to establish the
 great power status of the United States' Republic.

¹⁰Charles W. Johnson, Jr., The Cold War and After
 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp.
 2-3.

From 1918 through 1949, a total of thirty-one limited wars were fought, in well-defined geographic limits, for limited objectives and with limited means.

CHAPTER III

A CASE STUDY

The most important post-World War II development in the study of limited war is the Korean Intervention. The outbreak of hostilities seems, in retrospect, rather predictable, although it certainly was not anticipated by U.S. strategists. The shift in communist pressure, away from an area of relative U.S. military strength, and attendant risk, to an area strategically less important and containing minimal U.S. military strength seems rather logical. The selection of the Korean peninsula was aptly suited to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the U.S. strategic posture. Clearly, neither massive retaliation nor local defense were effective deterrents to aggression in this location.

The question of motives for a direct invasion are not so easily determined from the Soviet standpoint, but some reasonably good observations expose the advantages of this type of aggression. In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 27 September 1947, the decision was taken to withdraw the two U.S. Army divisions stationed in the U.N.-sponsored Republic of Korea. The decision was based on two considerations which, in themselves, throw no small amount of light on American strategic thinking:

1. The United States did not have sufficient military

CHAPTER III

A CASE STUDY

The most important post-war development in the study of Japan was the Korean intervention. The outbreak of hostilities there, in retrospect, within the framework of the study was not anticipated by U.S. strategists. The shift in communist posture, away from an even of relative U.S. military superiority, and towards the so-called strategic parity, was important and contained within the U.S. military strategy seems rather logical. The rejection of the Korean peninsula was only added to the strategic importance of the U.S. strategic posture. Clearly, another major relationship was local defense was effective defense to aggression in this location. The question of motives for a direct invasion was not as easily determined from the first standpoint, but some reasonable good observations suggest the objectives of this type of aggression. In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 September 1947, the decision was taken to withdraw the U.S. Army divisions stationed in the U.S. Armed Forces of Korea. The decision was based on two considerations which, in themselves, show no small amount of light on American strategic thinking:

1. The United States did not have sufficient military

interest in defending the Republic of Korea and, in fact, considered its defense a strategic liability.

2. The severe shortage of U.S. military man-power required the withdrawal of the Korean contingent.

Several factors determined President Truman's decision (on the advice of the National Security Council) to withdraw U.S. troops in the spring of 1949 and base the protection on indigenous security forces.

Since the United Nations had sponsored the new Republic of Korea, it was apparently felt that the aegis of that august organization would serve as a substitute for an adequate defense force. Furthermore, the announcement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops placed the onus squarely upon the United States to follow suit. What U.S. policymakers apparently chose to ignore was the rapid build-up of a large North Korean national army. The specific motive for the failure of the United States to assist and encourage the development of anything more than a skeleton South Korean police force was partly a fear that such a force would precipitate action to unite the Koreas.

American statesmen and military leaders, at this time, were outspoken in their declarations regarding American strategic interests in the Far East. General MacArthur, at a press conference in the spring of 1949, failed to include

interest in obtaining the Republic of Korea was, in fact, considered its desire a strategic liability.

2. The severe shortage of U.S. military manpower required the withdrawal of the Korean Peninsula.

3. The United States determined that the Korean Peninsula was the only area of the National Security Council's interest in the region in the spring of 1948 and was the only region on which the United States had a strategic interest.

4. Since the United States had sponsored the Republic of Korea, it was apparently felt that the Republic of Korea was a strategic liability for the United States. The Republic of Korea was a strategic liability for the United States because it was a strategic liability for the United States. The Republic of Korea was a strategic liability for the United States because it was a strategic liability for the United States.

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the Korean peninsula in his delineation of the U.S. "line of defense."¹

Secretary of State Acheson, at a speech before the National Press Club in January, 1950, delineated the same "defense perimeter" omitting Korea.²

If these statements, coupled with the withdrawal of American troops, were not an invitation to aggression, they were at least a clear indication of an area of vulnerability to a communist thrust. Statements such as those of MacArthur and Acheson notwithstanding, the primary factor which should have convinced the communists that they might attack the Republic of Korea with impunity was the paucity of U.S. ground forces relative to U.S. commitments. Critics of the Korean policy of the United States have denied this fact on the basis of the total U.S. forces making up the various occupation and garrison forces throughout the world. What these critics forget is that U.S. troop commitments were heavy. It would not suffice to do as was done in Korea. The communist threat was searching for an appropriate point in the thin defenses of the peripheral strategic area of Southeast Asia, which was bound to appear sooner or later,

¹The New York Times, March 2, 1949, p. 22.

²United States Department of State Bulletin XXII, January 23, 1950, pp. 115-116.

For further information, please contact the author at the following address:

1. The first group of people who are interested in the study of the history of the United States are the people who are interested in the history of the United States.

17. The Commission, cognate with the National of
National Group, was not involved in the process, they
were at least a direct indicator of the state of responsibility
in a country's affairs. The Commission was not at all
and should not be considered, the primary factor which should
have been the Commission that they have the right to

in the context of the political struggle of the communist party was something for an ideological point of view. It would not matter to be as done in 1955.

These things together in that the group committee was the communist and political forces throughout the world. While the party of the United States have denied this fact on grounds beyond relative to the communist. Chair of the

¹The New York Times, March 2, 1943, p. 33.
²United States Department of State Bulletin XVII,
January 27, 1950, pp. 112-113.

given the inadequacy of forces relative to requirements. The frequently-voiced U.S. intention to prepare to meet the Soviets in a general war over Western Europe was a clear enough index as to the priority of areas. General MacArthur's testimony at the MacArthur hearings, in 1951, verified the lack of reserve troops.³

The Soviet Union was fully justified in a conclusion that the United States would be forced to accede to an attack on the Republic of Korea by North Korean forces. Yet when the attack occurred in June 1950, the United States found sufficiently-compelling reasons to reverse its policy and to intervene. The basis for this policy change is probably the single-most interesting facet of the entire conflict.

The basic reason for the decision to intervene in Korea was one of fear. U.S. policymakers, using the analogy of Nazi salami tactics of the late 1930's, feared that acquiescence by the United States would lead shortly to a similar threat elsewhere (probably in Southeast Asia) under conditions more unfavorable than those in Korea. The conviction was that this "domino effect" would lead ultimately to a confrontation with the Soviet Union in a total war.

³United States Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 382.

Regardless of the Truman Administration's preoccupation with total war, the Korean Intervention was tacitly following the imperatives of a policy of containment in a gesture of national self-interest and supra-national idealism. On a national self-interest basis, the United States was taking an early stand in the interest of avoiding a more costly and more painful confrontation later and perhaps closer to home. Ideologically, the United States was assuming the posture of free world leadership in a crusade to resist communist world domination.

The belief that U.S. intervention enjoyed United Nations approval from its inception is incorrect. Purely and simply, the United States was behaving like a great power in unilaterally intervening over a violation of the rights of the Republic of Korea. The sequence of events is important. On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (minus the boycotting Soviet delegation) calling for an immediate end to the fighting and the assistance of all members in restoring peace. On June 27th, following the communist defiance of this resolution, the Security Council recommended that member nations assist the Republic of Korea. On the first day of the resolution, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Straits. He also instructed General MacArthur to evacuate Americans from Korea and to supply the South Korean Army

Department of the Treasury Administration's responsibilities with
 respect to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and finally following the
 Department of a policy of containment in a period of an-

almost self-interest and self-interest in the
 national self-interest basis, the United States was facing
 an early stage in the process of working a new policy and
 was behind many other nations and private firms of power.
 Ideologically, the United States was seeking the process of
 free world leadership in a strategy to create a common world
 domination.

The belief that U.S. intervention enjoys United
 Nations approval from the inception of interest, finally
 and simply, the United States was isolated into a world
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 right of the Republic of Korea. The document is now in
 Japan. On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security

Council passed a resolution (about the Korean issue)
 (Resolution) calling for an immediate end to the fighting and
 the restoration of all weapons in returning Korea. On June
 25, following the Korean War, the United Nations Security
 Council recommended that each nation accept
 the Republic of Korea. On the first day of the resolution,
 President Truman ordered the Republic of Korea into the Korean
 conflict. He also authorized General MacArthur to withdraw
 American forces and to supply the South Korean Army.

while using the American naval and air cover. On June 26th, in response to the increased military urgency of the situation, President Truman instructed MacArthur to use air and naval forces in support of the Republic of Korea. Finally, on June 30th, Truman authorized MacArthur to use the ground forces in his command. Nonetheless, United Nations sanction was eventually received, and the Korean Intervention took on the color of an international crusade under the aegis of a United Nations collective security action and the dominant leadership of American forces. The eagerness displayed by the United States in representing American intervention as an altruistic act of pure collective security tended to obscure the underlying basis of power politics without which intervention, regardless of U.N. sanction, would have been unjustifiable.⁴

Before attempting to envision the Korean Intervention as a model of containment, it would be well to observe the factors which make it a rather unusual case. First, the Republic of Korea had recently been established by free elections under U.N. supervision and, therefore, recognized as the lawful government south of the 38th parallel. Second, the attack was an overt act of aggression in direct violation

⁴Robert E. Osgood, Limited War--The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 163-167.

While using the American Navy and Air Corps in 1944, in response to the American military request of the United States, President Truman instructed Secretary of War and Navy to make in support of the Republic of Korea. Finally, in 1945, Truman authorized Secretary of War and Navy to make in the command. Consequently, United Nations attention was eventually received, and the Korean Information Board in the office of an international committee under the name of United Nations Collective Security Council and the United Nations of Korean Forces. The agreement signed by the United States in supporting Korean Information as an historic act of pure collective security would be known the underlying basis of pure collective security which investigation, regardless of U.S. interests, would have been unjustified.⁴

Before attempting to explain the Korean Information as a model of collectivism, it would be well to observe that factors which make it a unique historical event. First, the Republic of Korea had recently been separated by the division under U.S. supervision and, consequently, recognized as the legal government of the Republic of Korea. Second, the system was an early act of expansion in direct relation

⁴ Arthur A. Hays Sulzberger, *Editor of the New York Times*, 1944-1960, University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 173-174.

of the U.N. Charter. Finally, the Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations, thereby enabling the Security Council, through a questionable legal maneuver, to pass a resolution which otherwise could not have been passed. To anticipate other communist probes to be equally unequivocal and clear-cut would be an error. To base U.S. strategy upon such an assumption would be unfortunate.

The Korean conflict raised understandable fears over the problem of containing acts of lesser aggression by limited war. This problem was not to be solved in terms of ideology or collective security. In fact, the unfortunate choice of these media for cloaking U.S. motives tended to cloud a proper evaluation of the lessons of Korea in terms of the containment of future aggression. At the same time, the disparity between the dictates of containment and the traditional U.S. approach to war made the incident a rather painful experiment for the American public in the unfamiliar realm of power politics. The accompanying dismissal of General MacArthur in April, 1951, ignited a debate over the conduct of the Korean War which was both profound and revealing in the degree to which it gives an insight into American adjustment to the strategy of limited war. A proper evaluation of the lessons of Korea, therefore, calls for an appraisal of the conduct of the war as viewed by both sides of the controversy over MacArthur's recall.

of the U.S. Government. Similarly, the Soviet Union supported the United Nations, thereby leading the Security Council through a resolution to condemn the Soviet Union. To achieve this objective would not have been possible. To achieve other countries' interest to be really independent and also that would be an error. To have the strategy from such an assumption would be unreasonable.

The Soviet Union's policy was responsible for the war. The problem of conducting war is never solved by itself war. This problem was not as simple as it seems of strategy or collective security. In fact, the relationship of these two for giving U.S. policy leading to that a proper evaluation of the nature of war in fact of the conduct of future operations. At the same time, the disparity between the distance of commitment and the political U.S. approach to war made the United States gainful commitment for the American people in the military realm of power politics. The accompanying dismissal of General MacArthur in April 1951, ignited a debate over the conduct of the war which was both profound and revealing in the degree to which it gave an insight into American adjustment in the strategy of limited war. A proper evaluation of the nature of war, strategy, calls for an appraisal of the conduct of the war as viewed by both sides of the controversy over MacArthur's recall.

The View of the Truman Administration

In his memoirs, President Truman identifies the overriding aim in the Korean Intervention as the prevention of a Third World War.⁵

The administration believed that the invasion of the Republic of Korea was one of a series of probes sponsored by the Soviet Union to determine the maximum feasible limits of Soviet influence throughout the world. This tied in with the second decisive consideration which was the fear of over-commitment of forces in such a way as to make possible a successful aggression elsewhere. The general belief, therefore, was that Korea was a Soviet maneuver to involve the United States as heavily as possible in Korea in order to gain a free hand in Europe. An additional consideration in U.S. policy had a marked effect upon the actual conduct of the war. This was the preoccupation of the Truman Administration with the idea of maintaining good relations with America's allies. It was, therefore, believed that Allied unity required a certain deference to their wishes, as evidenced by forbidding air pursuit past the Yalu River, in the interests of avoiding the risk of escalation. This particular consideration makes the Korean War a classic example of

⁵ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1956), Volume II, pp. 345-346.

The View of the Truman Administration

In his memoirs, President Truman identifies the overriding aim in the Korean intervention as the prevention of a third world war.¹ The administration believed that the invasion of the peninsula of Korea was one of a series of probes sponsored by the Soviet Union to determine the western world's limits of Soviet influence throughout the world. This idea in itself was the second primary consideration which was the basis of the administration's policy. In such a way as to not provide a humiliating suggestion elsewhere. The general belief, therefore, was that Korea was a Soviet answer to involve the United States in Korea as heavily as possible in order to gain a free hand in Europe. An additional consideration in U.S. policy was a united effort with the United States of America. This was the preoccupation of the Truman administration with the idea of maintaining good relations with America's allies. It was, therefore, believed that Allied unity required a certain distance to be maintained, as was deemed by Truman, and further east the Red River, in the absence of avoiding the risk of escalation. This position for consideration was the reason for a classic example of

¹Harry S. Truman, Memories (New York: Doubleday, 1956), Volume II, pp. 145-147.

the tacit limitation of the political objectives and the effort to keep the military means in proportion with the political objectives as the circumstances of the war changed.⁶ The restrictions imposed by the United States were:

1. The confinement of air and ground operations to the limits of the Korean peninsula.
2. The withholding of the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops.
3. The rejection of the proposal for a blockade of the Chinese mainland.

In the first phase of the war, when U.N. forces were on the defensive, the objectives were limited to the restoration of peace and the recovery of the original border at the 38th parallel. This objective was announced in the U.N. resolutions of June 25 and 27. Military operations north of the 38th parallel were restricted to the destruction of military supplies. U.S. Air Force activity north of the 38th parallel was restricted to the confines of the Korean peninsula.

During the second phase of the war, when the U.N. forces were able to take the initiative, the political limitations were reappraised. As a result of this

⁶Osgood, op. cit., p. 170.

the exact situation of the political objectives was the effort to keep the military action in proportion with the political objectives at the discretion of the United States. The restrictions imposed by the United States were:

1. The limitation of air and ground operations to the limits of the Korean peninsula.
2. The withdrawal of the majority of Chinese Nationalist troops.
3. The rejection of the proposal for a blockade of the Chinese waters.

In the first phase of the war, when U.N. forces were on the defensive, the objectives were limited to the restoration of peace and the recovery of the original border at the 38th parallel. This objective was announced in the United Nations on July 27, 1950. Military operations north of the 38th parallel were restricted to the restoration of the 38th parallel. This was done during the first phase of the war. The second phase of the war, when the United Nations were on the offensive, the objectives were limited to the restoration of peace and the recovery of the original border at the 38th parallel. This objective was announced in the United Nations on July 27, 1950. Military operations north of the 38th parallel were restricted to the restoration of the 38th parallel. This was done during the first phase of the war.

reappraisal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of recommendations made by the National Security Council, authorized MacArthur, at the time of the Inchon landings to conduct ground operations north of the 38th parallel only if there were no indication of direct Communist Chinese or Soviet Russian intervention. After the success of the Inchon landings, MacArthur was further authorized to destroy the North Korean Army within Korea but, specifically, was prohibited from using non-Korean ground forces along the areas of the Chinese border and also from conducting air or naval action against sources of North Korean supplies in Manchuria. MacArthur failed to comply with the directive restricting the use of non-Korean ground forces, informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such a limitation was not militarily feasible. At this point, the political objective of the war was altered to achieve the long-standing goal of the Cairo Agreement of 1943 for a united Korea. Unable to stand success, the General Assembly passed a resolution to this effect. It was at this point that the Chinese People's Republic issued direct warnings against U.N. forces trespassing north of the 38th parallel. President Truman, with MacArthur's concurrence, chose to ignore these warnings, taking pains to announce the new political objectives and to warn the Chinese Communist Government that interference would constitute an act of aggression. In due course, the

Chinese Communist forces entered the conflict in strength on October 16, 1950. It was not until after MacArthur's unfortunate announcement, on October 24, of "a general offensive" to have his troops home by Christmas, that the United States became fully aware of a massive Chinese offensive.⁷

In the face of the Chinese offensive, the U.N. forces retreated to a line south of the 38th parallel. In January, 1951, General Ridgeway launched a limited offensive which succeeded in re-achieving roughly the 38th parallel. At this point, the Korean War turned into a stalemate and the Truman Administration once again altered its political objectives. Feeling that an extension of the war, at this point, would involve a risk of total war, which would be entirely out of proportion to the importance of the original objective, a policy change was initiated. Secretary of State Acheson, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 26, 1951, let it be known that the United States would be satisfied with the fulfillment of the original objective of repelling aggression and restoring South Korean independence.⁸

⁷Ibid., pp. 373-382.

⁸United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Program, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office), pp. 24-25.

On October 12, 1990, it was not until after midnight that the Soviet command began to withdraw its forces from the battlefield. The Soviet command had been unable to break through the American line, and the American command had been unable to break through the Soviet line. The battle ended in a tactical draw, but it was a strategic victory for the Americans. The Soviet command had been unable to achieve its objective of breaking through the American line, and the American command had been able to maintain its position. The battle was a turning point in the conflict, and it showed that the Americans were capable of standing up to the Soviet Union in a conventional war.

is the best of the Cuban situation, the U.S. forces
estimated to a line up of the U.S. forces in 1954.

1981's General Highway received a limited allowance which was included in re-allocating roughly the same amount. At this point, the system was turned into a highway and the Transit Administration was again given the political responsibility.

Feeling that an extension of the war, at this point, would involve a risk of total war, which would be entirely out of proportion to the importance of the original objective, a policy change was initiated. Instead of a full-scale

of existing conditions and working with those involved
be satisfied with the fulfillment of the national objective
from 16, 1951. It is to be known that the United States would
readily accept the World Committee on Foreign Affairs on

$$-0.68(-0.77) \times \text{age} + 0.13(0.19)^{\dagger}$$

United States Department of Justice, Division of Investigation, Washington, D.C. 20535
 Office of the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 400 ...
 (Washington: Government Printing Office) 1964-65

Domestic politics exerted a great deal of pressure on the decision-makers in Washington. During the 1952 Presidential campaign, the Republicans vowed to end the war in Korea, reduce taxes, balance the budget, and halt inflation. During the campaign, charges were leveled at the incumbent Democratic Administration of waging a war in Korea without the will to victory. Charges were further made that the hampering limitations imposed upon U.S. military commanders had resulted in stalemates and constituted an ignominious form of bartering with the enemy. There was strong pressure from such congressional keymen as Senators Knowland, Jenner, Malone, and Taft for a firmer posture in Korea to stop the threat of Asiatic Communism. The President disagreed with these dissident voices. He estimated that an advance of even ninety miles, to the narrow waist of the Korean peninsula, would cost about four billion dollars. Such an advance might well bring about a general war. As a result, the concept of limited victory was espoused.

On July 28, 1953, a truce was signed at Panmunjon. No South Korean signed it. The Korean Intervention had lasted over thirty-seven months. American casualties were 33,629 dead and 103,284 wounded. The frontier was remarkably similar to that of 1950. There had been no forced repatriations. There had been no system of inspection established to insure that preparations were not being made for another

attack. The victory was limited--yet the purpose of the North Korean invasion had not been accomplished.⁹

Certainly, the Koreans had failed in their first offensive; and the Chinese, in turn, had failed to hurl the Eighth Army into the sea. But the United States was the greatest power in the world. Morally, then, America's non-victory was, in fact, a defeat. In the same way, China's non-defeat was a victory. Politically, this peace without victory in a limited war marked a significant turning point in the history of the twentieth century.¹⁰

What, in summary, were the achievements of the Korean intervention? By limiting the ends and the means of war and by balancing political and military objectives in the light of their effect on the scale of war and the risk of escalation, the United States, with measured resistance, succeeded in containing aggression short of total war. Had this been the announced objective instead of a crusade to defeat Communist aggression, the Korean experience would not have been interpreted so bitterly by the American public. In the light of the conduct of limited war, the Korean war was a significant and praiseworthy achievement. Yet, the question

⁹ Herbert Agar, The Price of Power: America Since 1945 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 164-167.

¹⁰ Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958), p. 27.

has been raised whether the Truman Administration had conducted the war in the most effective manner consistent with the limitation of war and, further, whether those self-imposed limitations were wise and consistent with the objectives at stake. This is basically the question which was aired in the public furor which followed the dismissal of General MacArthur.

MacArthur's View

After repeated evidence of an unwillingness to accept the policies of President Truman for the conduct of the war; and, after a series of public moves whereby he sought to promote his own policies, General MacArthur was relieved of his commands in Korea and Japan on April 10, 1951. This action keyed off a furious controversy in the United States and culminated in a Senate investigation of MacArthur's recall and the Far Eastern situation during May and June of 1951. What was interesting in the controversy was that both sides advocated a limited war.

MacArthur's advocated objectives were:

1. To stop aggression in Korea.
2. To secure a cease-fire agreement.
3. To negotiate a settlement consistent with the U.N. objective of a unified Korea.¹¹

¹¹United States Congress, Senate, op. cit., pp. 167-188.

General MacArthur opposed unlimited military measures to achieve these objectives. He opposed the engagement of Communist Chinese ground forces on the mainland outside the Korean peninsula. MacArthur proposed, in the pursuit of his objectives, the bombing of Manchurian airfields, a blockade of the Chinese coast, and the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea and South China. He contended that these measures, if adopted, would achieve the limited objectives of the U.N. more quickly, with fewer casualties, and with less risk of escalating the conflict into a general war. If these measures were not adopted, General MacArthur proposed two other ways of limiting the war as alternatives to total defeat. The first alternative, made in the early stages of the war, was an armistice on the basis of the 38th parallel. The second alternative, made in the last stage of the war, was a complete withdrawal from Korea.¹²

The basis for the controversy was the difference of view concerning the three principal measures advocated by MacArthur. This difference arose from divergent estimates of their military advantage and of the risk of escalation and the overcommitment which they entailed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not dispute the military advantage of MacArthur's proposals. They did maintain, however, that the

¹²Truman, op. cit., pp. 433-434.

General MacArthur opposed limited military measures to achieve these objectives. He opposed the deployment of American troops outside the limits of the Republic of China, the stationing of American troops in Manchuria, the stationing of American troops in the Chinese coast, and the employment of Chinese troops in Korea and North China. He contended that such measures, if adopted, would achieve the limited objectives of the U.S. more quickly, with fewer casualties, and with less risk of escalating the conflict into a general war. If such measures were not adopted, General MacArthur proposed two other ways of limiting the war as alternatives to total defeat. The first alternative, made in the early stages of the war, was an armistice on the basis of the 38th parallel. The second alternative, made in the last stage of the war, was a complete withdrawal from Korea.¹⁷

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¹⁷ Truman, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

adoption of these measures would expand the war and increase the risk of total war without giving any commensurate assurance of a quicker and less costly military decision.

The crux of the public appeal MacArthur's proposals exerted in the United States was that he had made a strong case for the public impression of what kind of a war it was. Probably the best summation of the whole issue was made by General Bradley:

So long as we regarded the Soviet Union as the main antagonist and western Europe as the main prize, [the proposals made by General MacArthur] would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place, and with the wrong enemy.¹³

Using the same rhetoric, Secretary of State Acheson expressed the fear that MacArthur's proposals would seriously elevate the ultimate risk of involving the United States in the "wrong war" but with "the right enemy," the Soviet Union, in any of several possible courses of Soviet intervention varying from volunteer troops to an all-out war.¹⁴ A final major difference of views existed in MacArthur's disinterest in the importance of Allied unity.

The differences in view cited above implied a deeper and more serious misconception, on MacArthur's part, of the

¹³United States Congress, Senate, op. cit., pp. 731-732.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 1718-1719.

adoption of these measures would extend the war and increase the risk of total war without gaining any commensurate return. A number of other leading military leaders, including the top of the public opinion pollsters' organization, pointed to the United States war that had made a strong case for the public opinion of war and of a victory. It was precisely the best example of the whole issue was made by

General Pershing.

As long as we regarded the matter as the only alternative and without having to the main issue, the proposals made by General Pershing would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place, and with the wrong enemy.¹³

Using the same rhetoric, Secretary of State Nathan C. Tamm last year last year's proposals would seriously damage the United States of America. The United States in the "wrong war" and with the right enemy, the United States, in any of several possible courses of United States action. Various from various groups to an all-out war.¹⁴ A final major difference of view existed in Pershing's statement in the Department of Army.

The difference in view cited above raised a question and some serious circumstances, on Pershing's part, of the

¹³ United States Congress, House, 200-212, 201-211.

meaning and conduct of limited war. His understandable obsession with total victory ("in war, there is no substitute for victory") was basically antithetical to the entire concept of the limitation of means and ends. The Truman Administration entered, fought, and ended the Korean War for political objectives, which took precedence over the conduct of battle. MacArthur, on the other hand, regarded the whole purpose of war as:

. . . destroying the enemy's military power and bringing the conflict to a decisive close in the minimum of time and with a minimum of loss.¹⁵

The ironic aspect of the whole controversy was that MacArthur's views agreed more closely with the guiding ideals which the Truman Administration had established for the war, than the Administration itself. The Administration had, quite naturally, been forced to make a tacit qualification of these guiding ideals by considering strategic priorities and the relation between commitments and available power.¹⁶

The Lessons of Korea

The foremost lesson of the Korean Intervention is that it demonstrated that the United States could successfully resist direct military aggression, locally, by limited

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 83.

war in the secondary strategic areas, where a demonstrated capacity for local resistance was the only effective deterrent to communist military aggression.¹⁷ Although U.S. intervention in Korea struck an effective blow for the containment of communist aggression, it also incurred some fairly serious drawbacks. The United States permitted the Chinese People's Republic to gain considerable prestige among the smaller nations of Asia, while at the same time raising doubts among those nations as to the ability of the U.S. to defend them. At the same time, the United States committed itself to the defense of a strategically profitless area in a difficult political environment. The question of whether or not the United States, by pursuing a harder policy, could have done better may forever remain unanswered. However, a proper evaluation of the lessons of Korea demands at least an attempt to answer several trenchant questions.

The first question regards the U.S. estimate of the risk of involving Soviet Russia in a general war. Was the Truman Administration's cost-risk calculation valid? The fear of escalation was the chief reason for the stringent limitations placed on U.S. military action by the Administration. It would appear, in retrospect, that the U.S.

¹⁷Osgood, op. cit., p. 178.

was in the secondary strategic stage, which is demonstrated
 clearly by the fact that the only military action
 that the communist military apparatus⁴ although U.S.
 intervention in Korea forces an effective blow for the
 elimination of communist aggression, it also limited the
 military action elsewhere. The United States limited the
 Chinese troops' operations to gain a strategic purpose
 against the United Nations of Asia, while at the same time
 raising doubts about their action as to the ability of the
 U.S. to defend Korea. At the same time, the United States
 continued to act in the defense of a strategically pro-
 ductive area in a strategic political movement. The ques-
 tion of whether or not the United States is pursuing a
 world policy, which would have been very different from
 unilateral, however, a system of relations of the United
 States demands at least an attempt to answer several ques-
 tions.

The first question regards the U.S. system of the
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 United States' cost-risk calculation with the
 kind of escalation war the United States for the strategic
 limitations placed on U.S. military action by the United
 States. It would appear, in retrospect, that the U.S.

calculation was in error. It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would have allowed itself to be drawn directly into the war except in response to a direct attack on Soviet territory. This conclusion is generally concurred in by U.S. intelligence reports and the ex post facto analyses of U.S. senior military commanders in the Far East.¹⁸ The conclusion is logical in an over-all view of the situation including the existence of a nuclear monopoly by the United States.

A second, rather obvious, question deals with the estimate by the United States Government of the danger of overcommitment. Aside from the threat of total war, the Truman Administration was governed by a fear that overcommitment of American troops in Korea would expose a more strategic area of U.S. national interests to a communist probe. It is considered a legitimate estimate and the conservative policy of the Administration was well justified by the woeful unpreparedness of the United States for limited war in 1949. It is true that the Chinese Communist ground forces were at near maximum effort, given the current level of Soviet material support. However, 80 per cent of the effective armed forces of the United States were tied up in

¹⁸Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: MacMillan, 1955), p. 176.

evaluation was in error, it is only likely that the Soviet Union would have allowed itself to be taken aback by the new concept in response to a direct appeal by Soviet leadership. This conclusion is generally supported by the U.S. intelligence reports and the 1955 State analysis of U.S. foreign military movements in the Far East.¹⁴ The conclusion is logical in an overall view of the situation

including the assistance of a nuclear monopoly by the United States.

A second, rather obvious, question deals with the estimate by the United States Government of the danger of development. Again from the point of view of the U.S. Government, the danger was perceived by a long time ago. The commitment of nuclear energy in Soviet hands would be a strategic asset of U.S. national interest to a considerable degree. It is considered a legitimate estimate and the development policy of the Administration was well justified by the Soviet representation of the United States for limited war in 1955. It is true that the United States Government forced war at each nation's risk. Given the Soviet level of Soviet nuclear support, however, it was not in the effective Soviet Union of the United States was tied up in

¹⁴U.S. State Department, U.S. Foreign Military Movements (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), p. 177.

the Korean campaign. If any lesson can be drawn, it is that the containment of communist aggression along a 20,000 mile defense perimeter will require a limited war capability far greater than that possessed by the United States in 1949.¹⁹

A third, and rather searching, question concerns the decision to cross the 38th parallel and to expand the political objectives to the unification of Korea. Some people, it is said, just cannot stand success. The decision to expand the objectives has been bemoaned by many an expert, including George Kennan. From a legal standpoint, the new objective had a sound basis. But from a political and military standpoint, it did not. Taking into consideration the military unpreparedness, the low priority of Korea, the risk of escalation, and the dangers of overcommitment, it is felt that the decision was unfortunate. W. W. Rostow expressed it very aptly:

Whatever more mature considerations were brought to bear on national policy, it was a simple, universally understandable truth that the nation had gambled, its bluff had been called, and it had not backed its play.²⁰

A final question deals with the concern expressed by the Truman Administration, in its conduct of the war, for

¹⁹Osgood, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

²⁰W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harpers, 1960), p. 241.

the maintenance of Allied unity. Had the U.S. deference to its Allies been as great as critics claim, it is doubtful that the U.S. would have decided to intervene in Korea with such celerity. There is nothing to suggest that the United States refrained from taking any measures that would have substantially affected the course of the war on account of the views of its Allies. The decision to intervene unilaterally was made without prior consultation. There is no reason to conclude that it was a serious factor in the conduct of the war. From a purely political viewpoint, Allied unity was important but not vital. The United States, together with the Republic of Korea, bore over 90 per cent of the burden of the war.²¹

It is understood that some aspects of these questions are yet unclear and unresolved and all of them are subject to some degree of conjecture. However, if the United States is to gain from the lessons of Korea, it is through serious consideration of these four questions that the learning process is begun.

The lessons taught by Korea were to affect the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as well. The Korean War was a logical extension of Stalin's policy, clearly tested in Europe. Balked in Europe and frustrated in its progress

²¹Osgood, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

1. The system of the law is

It is understood that some of the following are not yet included and may be included in the future. It is also noted that the following are not yet included and may be included in the future.

...the Russian people by their own hands, and the Russian people will not allow this. The Russian people will not allow this. The Russian people will not allow this.

elsewhere, this policy was applied in Asia by escalating the Cold War to violence. The real motivation for the attack on Korea was to test the tenacity of the principle of containment in a place inconvenient for the United States and under conditions different from any earlier application of the doctrine.²² Containment, even in Asia, was found to have teeth.

²²Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War and After (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 99.

CHAPTER IV

VIET NAM--A SECOND CASE STUDY

The war, in which the United States is currently involved in Viet Nam, has been labeled, by Bernard Fall, the Second Indochina War. It began by deliberate communist design in 1957; and, abetted by American fumbling, it spread to Laos in 1959.¹ Under the direction of the Johnson Administration, a signal change in the complexion of the war, as well as the degree of U.S. involvement, occurred in February, 1965, with the introduction of escalation as a policy. At the time of this writing, escalation has continued, with an unsuccessful pause, to the point of deep air interdiction raids to within a few miles of Hanoi.

A brief summary of events leading up to the beginning of the Second Indochina War is useful. The movement for Vietnamese independence was strongly influenced by the catalytic effect of Japanese domination during World War II. The break, in French domination of Indochina, provided by the war and by French weakness, was the single-most important factor which spelled the beginning of the end of French colonialism in Southeast Asia. The attempt to restore

¹Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet Nams, A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 316.

The case, in which the United States is currently involved in Viet Nam, has been labeled by Secretary Hall, the Special Assistant Sec. to Deputy Secretary of Defense, as being in 1957 and, added by Secretary Hall, as being in 1957. Under the direction of the Bureau of the Department, a signal change in the composition of the case, as well as the copy of T.A. Information, occurred in January, 1957, with the intervention of Secretary as a policy. At the time of this writing, escalation has continued, with an unsuccessful phase, in the point of deep air interdiction, with a few miles of ground.

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tant factor, in French domination of Indochina, provided by
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of the Second Indochina War in 1954. The movement for
a united country at events leading up to the beginning

¹ Bernard A. Wall, The New York Times, A Political and Literary History (New York: Knopf, 1937), p. 116.

French influence, in 1945, found the incipient seeds of resistance already planted, which blossomed, in 1946, into the First Indochina War. This war lasted until 1954. The resistance war period was one of all-out revolution to achieve national independence for all three regions of Viet Nam, under Viet Minh control. The denial, by Viet Minh leadership, of any links between international communism and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, obtained for them the widest possible international support in the struggle to overthrow French domination. The nationalist pose struck by Ho Chi Minh was an essential part of this strategy.

Two factors in 1949 and 1950 caused a significant change in Viet Minh strategy. The first was the victory of Mao Tse Tung in China in 1949, which brought a friendly communist regime to the Tonkinese border. The second factor was the partially successful attempt by the French to install the Bao Dai regime in power. This was basically an effort to woo the forces of nationalism away from the Viet Minh camp.

The first factor mentioned above enabled a gradual shift from "stage one to stage two."² This stage of revolutionary war saw Viet Minh forces taking an occasional

²Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 292-293.

tactical initiative in the form of local counter-offensives against the French forces. The stages of revolutionary war were formulated earlier by Giap Long and were: defense, equilibrium, and offense.³

The second factor, that of the threat of the Bao Dai regime, resulted in a definite change in the complexion of the Viet Minh movement from a nationalist to a communist character. This was a grave tactical error in that the Viet Minh ran afoul of the newly-formulated U.S. policy of containment.⁴

After more than seven years of military operations, the Viet Minh achieved partial success from the Geneva Accords of 1954, whose terms were as much a result of international forces as of the battlefield decision of Dien Bien Phu.

U.S. Involvement

The first U.S. contacts with Ho Chi Minh were in 1944-1945 through O.S.S. agents in China. The psychological

³Bert Cooper et al., Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Viet Nam 1941-1954 (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1964), p. 82. Ellen Hammer points out in the previous footnote, that although the revolutionaries talked a great deal about it, they never accomplished the transition into stage three.

⁴Hammer, op. cit., p. 247.

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⁴ Robert Cooper et al., Communist Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Viet Nam 1941-1954 (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1964), p. 11. While Cooper points out in the previous footnote, that although the revolutionaries called a great deal about it, they never accomplished the transition into stage three.

effect of early U.S. military support (oriented against the Japanese) was probably of greater importance than its military effect.⁵

As early as the summer of 1949, Secretary of State Acheson categorically gave warning to the Chinese People's Republic regarding aggression against her Southeast Asian neighbors.⁶ The prompt recognition, extended by the United States to the Bao Dai regime, on February 7, 1950, though perhaps ill advised, was a further step in her involvement in Southeast Asia. In a show of support for the Bao Dai government, two American warships dropped anchor off Saigon in March, 1950. In May of the same year, Secretary of State Acheson announced the commencement of U.S. military and economic aid "to restore security and develop genuine nationalism in Indochina."⁷ In December, the Vietnamese Government was invited to San Francisco, as a further gesture of recognition, to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. During this same period, Ngo Dinh Diem was enjoying political exile and the hospitality of the Maryknoll Fathers in New Jersey.⁸

U.S. involvement gradually deepened, and its aid to

⁵Cooper, op. cit., pp. 106-7.

⁶Hammer, op. cit., p. 267. Quoted from the United States Department of State, United States Relations with China, p. xxvii.

⁷Ibid., p. 271.

⁸Ibid., pp. 271-286.

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⁶ Cooper, op. cit., pp. 104-7.

⁷ Acheson, op. cit., p. 187. Quoted from the United
 States Department of State, United States Relations with
 China, p. xxvii.

⁸ Ibid., p. 171.
⁹ Ibid., pp. 171-182.

Viet Nam increased. By 1954, the United States was paying more than 80 per cent of all French military expenditures in Indochina. The aid, which began in 1950, averaged five hundred million dollars annually and was delivered directly to the French under the supervision of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group.

This enormous U.S. investment, in Indochina, indicates a decisive change in policy towards Southeast Asia. (Witness the previous statement by Acheson.) The indifference, shown by America, towards Vietnamese aspirations for independence had perhaps contributed to the present situation in that beleaguered country. Now, by 1954, a massive shift in U.S. policy was in full force and would continue in strength and militancy until, in 1965, it would constitute a serious threat to world peace and security.

Two dates signaled the end of French influence in Southeast Asia and the beginning of serious U.S. involvement: September 29, 1954, and April 26, 1956. The dates mark, respectively, the end of French military and political presence. French disengagement was rapid and total. The problem of the two Viet Nams--North and South--was now the exclusive burden and responsibility of the United States.⁹

⁹Fall, op. cit., pp. 318-322.

Problems of Limited War in Viet Nam

The alacrity with which the United States assumed the burden in Viet Nam was, unfortunately, not matched by any real awareness of the issues at stake. The major problem, and a basic one, was conceptual. The belief that the United States was dealing with the last, hard-core remnants of Viet Minh activity was still widely held by many U.S. military men as late as 1958.¹⁰

In actual fact, a gradual but massive build-up had been going on for several years. As a result of this error, it became necessary for the Kennedy Administration to report huge infiltration estimates, out of proportion to what was reasonably occurring.

Between 1959 and the summer of 1964, as many as 34,300 guerrillas infiltrated South Viet Nam from the North. Of the total, 19,000 were "confirmed" and 15,300 "probables." The annual flow of confirmed infiltrators grew from 1,800 in 1959 and 1960 to 3,700 in 1961 and further to 5,800 in 1962. In 1963, the number decreased slightly, to about 4,000, but has increased ever since then. During the first seven months of 1964, the figures rose to 4,000 confirmed and

¹⁰ Hammer, op. cit., pp. 324-325. Admiral Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific, was quoted in March, 1958, before a Congressional Committee, as saying that the Vietnamese were "still having some trouble in some areas."

Problems of Limited War in Viet Nam

The identity with which the United States entered the Vietnam War was, undoubtedly, not shared by any other members of the United Nations. The major problem, and a basic one, was conceptual. The belief that the United States was dealing with the last, hard-core remnants of Viet Nam activity was still widely held by many U.S. military men as late as 1968.¹⁰

In actual fact, a gradual but sensitive build-up had been going on for several years. As a result of this error, it became necessary for the Kennedy Administration to report more information regarding the progress of operations in Viet Nam to the American people.

Between 1954 and the summer of 1964, an army of 34,300 personnel was stationed in Viet Nam from the North. Of the total, 19,000 were "combatants" and 15,300 "supporters." The number of combatants stationed in Viet Nam grew from 1,500 in 1954 and 1955 to 3,400 in 1956 and further to 5,600 in 1957. In 1957, the number decreased slightly, to about 4,000, but has increased ever since then. During the first seven months of 1964, the United States had 16,000 soldiers and

¹⁰ Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 12-1-62, subject: "Vietnam." Commanded in Chief, Pacific, was quoted in Marine, 1968, before a Congressional Committee, as saying that the Viet-Nam were "still having some trouble in some areas."

6,000 probables. By simple extrapolation, a yearly figure of 20,000 could be expected.¹¹

One of the most serious problems of the war in Viet Nam, to date, is the failure of the United States to assess fully the socio-political situation in South Viet Nam for what it really is. Although the limited use of force in U.S. foreign policy has, by now, been accepted as nothing more than a military or para-military adjunct to what is essentially a political power maneuver, the real nature of the political unrest in South Viet Nam has never been fully assessed or appreciated.

The revolution presently in progress in South Viet Nam should not be confused with the Hanoi-directed insurgency, despite Communist efforts to take credit for it. Insurgency certainly contributed to the climate in which the revolution was nurtured--but the two movements are not the same.

It should be noted that the present program of insurgency is nothing more than the latest phase of a forty-year

¹¹Time, February 5, 1965. These figures were quoted from a Defense Department release on an intelligence report. The high percentage of probables and the impossibility of checking figures permits adjustment to accommodate for errors which this writer feels were made in U.S. military estimates of the Vietnamese situation prior to 1958. Bernard Fall, in op. cit., questions the accuracy of official U.S. infiltration figures for this same period.

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essentially a political power structure. The real failure is

the political system in North Vietnam has never been fully

accepted or understood.

The revolution basically is progress in North Vietnam

has should not be confused with the hard-headed labor-

group, despite Communist attacks in every possible form.

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11. Final Report, February 2, 1955. These figures were derived from a Defense Department reliance on an intelligence report. The high percentage of production and the responsibility of creating figures which allowed for considerable for errors when this report was made in U.S. military estimates of the Vietnamese situation prior to 1955. Report will, in my view, question the accuracy of all the U.S. intelligence figures for this same period.

campaign waged by the Indo-Chinese Communist Party to acquire complete political control over all Viet Nam, hegemony over Laos and some form of control over Cambodia. The various forms which this campaign has taken, as well as the labels under which it has been advertised, have successfully deceived the Vietnamese people and foreign observers as well. In the same vein, U.S. policymakers appear to have been taken in.

The Communists took full advantage of the disorder of the Diem regime and its successors. It has concentrated on the South Vietnamese peasantry against urban-oriented Saigon regimes. The revolution stems from a deep-seated regionalism which the Viet Cong have successfully exploited and a strong nationalism which, prior to 1954, successively expressed itself against French and Japanese repression.

The important fact is that what is going on in South Viet Nam is a revolution. This revolution is being exploited by the North Vietnamese government. The revolution involves a quest for Vietnamese answers to Viet Nam's political problems. No solutions could be less Vietnamese, nor more alien to basic Vietnamese traditions than those offered by Communist doctrine. Communism is doctrinally committed to the abolition of the two basic Vietnamese social institutions--extended family and private property. Furthermore, Hanoi's Communism is under direct Chinese patronage and

campaign waged by the Indo-Chinese Communist Party to
 organize complete political control over all Viet Nam, have
 every man, woman and child in control over himself. The
 various laws with this character are being as well as the
 laws which have been established, have successfully
 delivered the Vietnamese people and their children as well.
 In the same vein, U.S. politicians agree to have been
 taken in.
 The Communist took full advantage of the situation
 the Viet regime and its supporters. It has concentrated on
 the North Vietnamese government against other nations and
 regimes. The revolution came from a deep-seated regional-
 law which the Viet Govt have successfully exploited and a
 strong nationalist which, since 1954, successfully ex-
 pressed itself against French and Japanese domination.
 The important fact is that what is going on in North
 Viet Nam is a revolution. This revolution is being ac-
 quitted by the North Vietnamese government. The revolution
 involves a year for Vietnamese people to Viet Nam's politi-
 cal freedom. No situation could be more favorable, the
 more alive to North Vietnamese traditions than those offered
 by Communist doctrine. Communism is essentially consistent
 to the tradition of the two North Vietnamese social institu-
 tions--extended family and village community. Furthermore,
 North's Communism is what direct Chinese patronage and

opposition to Chinese domination is one of the great continuing themes of Vietnamese history.

The fact that the political unrest in South Viet Nam is based on local problems (exacerbated by North Vietnamese insurgency) explains the inability of U.S. policy to produce political stability there. The apparent support given to the Viet Cong by the South Vietnamese peasantry, which is the keystone to recent Viet Cong successes, is bitterly frustrating to the American military effort and to the American people. This frustration points up the continuing belief in the United States that the solution to all problems lies in the military defeat of the North Vietnamese campaign of insurgency.

If South Viet Nam's real revolution does not destroy the country first, it may, in the long run, be the eventual undoing of Communist ambitions and produce a real national entity where none has previously existed.¹²

Another conceptual error was what Bernard Fall calls the "Korean Trauma."¹³ MAAG commanders and other military advisers trained, organized, and prepared for another Korean type war. Considering the distinct lack of North Korean

¹²George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in South Viet Nam," Foreign Affairs, Vol 43, April, 1965, pp. 404-8.

¹³Fall, loc. cit.

opposition to Chinese domination is one of the great...
 planning among the Vietnamese hierarchy.
 The fact that the political unrest in North Vietnam
 is based on local problems exacerbated by North Vietnamese
 intervention against the stability of the policy to produce
 political stability there. The argument about even to
 the Viet Cong by the North Vietnamese hierarchy, which is
 the key to the recent Viet Cong successes, is directly
 threatening to the American military effort and to the
 American people. This situation points up the continuing
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 lems lies in the military defeat of the North Vietnamese
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 It is such Viet Nam's real revolution does not destroy
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 entity where none was previously existed.¹²
 Another conceptual error was that several fail calls
 the "Foreign Threat".¹³ Many communists and other military
 advisers trained, organized, and recruited for another Korean
 type war. Considering the distinct lack of North Korean

¹² George F. Colver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in
 North Viet Nam," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, April, 1965, p.
 404-6.

¹³ Idem, Idem, Idem.

success in 1951, it should have been clear that an overt act of aggression was the least likely possibility in Viet Nam. In April, 1962, General O'Daniel, an earlier MAAG commander, described the South Korean Army as "eight well-organized and well-trained divisions with supporting weapons suitable for jungle warfare" but "trained for fighting conventional wars."¹⁴

A third area of misconception was the belief, of U.S. military advisers, that external defense was divorced from internal security. U.S.-trained internal security forces were better trained and equipped to handle minor civil disorders than to cope with a massive infiltration by dedicated, hard-core regulars. The American military officers, evaluating Viet Nam's internal security problems used the same criteria as did the French Generals Carpentier, Salan, and Navarre. The United States had learned little from the sad experience of its predecessors in Viet Nam.

Following an American tendency to over-compensate, American defense officials allowed the need for COIN (counter-insurgency) forces to become almost obsessive. In all of this fixation with Special Forces, special arms, equipment, aircraft and techniques, there ran the threat of one basic error. U.S. policymakers, as well as military

¹⁴Ibid.

success in 1951, it should have been clear that an effort was
 of organization was not least likely, possibly in the form
 in April, 1951, General Gurnea, an earlier war commander,
 suggested the Joint Chiefs Army as being well-organized and
 well-trained. Gurnea also suggested various outside the
 Army's military, but trained for fighting conventional
 war. The third arm of the organization was the Joint, of 7.5,
 military element, that retained control and directed from
 military element. It was trained in tactical tactics
 were better trained and equipped to handle more than 100-
 counts than to cope with a massive infiltration by soldiers,
 third-arm regular. The American military officers, various
 ing that the military element would use the same
 tactics as the first and second elements, Japan, and
 however. The first element had learned little from the war
 experience of the past several years in the war.
 following an American tendency to over-estimate
 American defense officials claimed the need for 100M
 (counter-terrorist) forces to become almost obsolete. In
 all of this situation with special forces, special arms,
 equipment, aircraft and personnel, there was the threat of
 one main error. U.S. policymakers, as well as military

men, were equating firepower with manpower. This approach was made fairly in the teeth of overwhelming French experience to the contrary. The fact remains that "jungle war is a war of highly trained specialists where the actual man and minor infantry tactics are dominant."¹⁵

A review of the manpower experiences of the French in Viet Nam is revealing. In May, 1947, French Minister of War Paul Coste-Floret stated that Viet Nam was kept well under control by an expeditionary force of 115,000 men. However, he added, it would easily require 500,000 men to undertake the conquest of Indochina.¹⁶

In 1955, the Viet Minh Army, including regulars, regional troops and local militia numbered somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000. Opposing this force were some 420,000 troops of the French Union. The Vietnamese Army, at the end of 1953, numbered some 200,000 men.¹⁷ The inadequacy of this ratio became painfully obvious the following year. The balance sheet should be of interest to U.S. policymakers. After seven years of fighting in Indochina, the total cost

¹⁵James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 77.

¹⁶Hammer, op. cit., p. 207.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 287.

and, were spending thousands with no success. This expenditure was made fairly in the light of conventional French expectations in the monetary. The fact remains that France was in a way of highly inflated speculation where the actual and the virtual inflationary process are combined.¹⁵

A review of the monetary expansion of the French in Viet Nam is revealing. In May, 1947, French Minister of War Paul Coste-Lurion stated that Viet Nam was right well when covered by an approximately 100,000 men. However, he added, it would really require 200,000 men to undertake the conquest of Indochina.¹⁶

In 1952, the Viet Minh Army, including regular regional troops and local militia numbered somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000. Opposing this force were some 250,000 troops of the French Union. The Vietnamese Army, at the end of 1951, numbered some 400,000 men.¹⁷ The tendency of this ratio became gradually obvious the following year. The balance sheet should be of interest to U.S. policymakers. After seven years of fighting in Indochina, the actual cost

¹⁵ James H. Brown, *Conflict in the Siam*, The Bureau and Politics of Siam (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 77.

¹⁶ Brown, op. cit., p. 207.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 227.

to France was sixteen hundred billion francs, twice the total Marshall Plan aid, and ninety thousand casualties.¹⁸

U.S. expenditures in South Viet Nam since 1954 have been considerable. Economic aid alone, between 1954 and 1965, exceeded \$2,000,000,000 for a country numbering less than 16,000,000 inhabitants.¹⁹

As of May, 1965, total U.S. troops in Viet Nam numbered 46,000. In view of the above figures, the U.S./French troop ratio becomes an interesting commentary on U.S. political and military thinking as well as an indication of the possible cost of continued U.S. involvement in Viet Nam.²⁰

Tactics in Viet Nam

Only a brief overview of military tactics is attempted in this paper. On the Viet Cong (an abbreviation for Vietnamese Communist) side, the main techniques applied are terrorism, political indoctrination, and guerrilla warfare. Obviously, the Viet Cong are still functioning in Stage Two of Giap's stages of revolutionary war.

Terrorism took the form of assassination, first of the local chieftains, then of school teachers, then social

¹⁸Ibid., p. 297. A quote from a speech made by President Auriol in 1952.

¹⁹Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech on "U.S. Foreign Policy," May 13, 1965. Printed in The New York Times, May 13, 1965.

²⁰The New York Times, May 23, 1965.

to Vietnam via direct flights between Saigon and Hanoi. The
 total monthly cost of this aid, and other financial assistance,¹⁸
 U.S. expenditures in South Vietnam since 1954 have
 been considerable. Economic aid alone, between 1954 and
 1963, amounted to \$1,000,000,000 for a country numbering less
 than 25,000,000 inhabitants.¹⁹
 As of May, 1963, total U.S. troops in South Vietnam
 stood at 16,000. In view of the above figures, the U.S. military
 group tends to become an interesting commentary on U.S. political
 and military thinking as well as on the situation of the
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Tactics in Vietnam

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 Terrorism took the form of assassination, first of
 the local elite, then of school teachers, then social

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 197. A quote from a speech made by
 President Johnson in 1963.

¹⁹ Johnson, p. 197. Speech on "U.S. foreign policy,"
 May 13, 1963. Printed in The New York Times, May 13, 1963.

²⁰ The New York Times, May 13, 1963.

workers and, finally, American advisers. At the time of Admiral Stump's comment (fn. 10, supra, p. 61) local chiefs were being assassinated at the rate of ten per day. From 1961 to 1963, over 13,000 heads of villages were murdered.²¹

The technique of assassination proved to be tremendously effective not only as a technique for terrorism but also in contributing to the social, cultural, and administrative breakdown of the rural populace. By this means, a vital link between the government and the vast rural segment was broken. This fact alone should have started bells ringing all over Washington. However, it initially received notice more as a problem of internal security rather than a huge communist attack at the very cohesion of the South Viet Nam government.

Viet Cong political indoctrination was carried out through the intense indoctrination received by the 90,000 who emigrated to North Viet Nam and later returned as agents.

Guerrilla warfare, as practiced by the Viet Cong, is neither new nor particularly sophisticated. A review of the textbooks of Mao Tse Tung and his predecessor, Sun Tsu, show very little change in two thousand years. What is significant about the Viet Cong variety of guerrilla warfare is its

²¹Fall, op. cit., p. 360.

[illegible]

through the income identification received by the 30,000
who migrated to North Viet Nam and later returned as
Viet Cong political indoctrination was carried out

very little change in two thousand years. What is right-
ness of the law and the profession, and the, when
nothing new has particularly happened. A review of the
Gentile world, as presented by the Holy Spirit, is

conservative character. There are few, if any, occasions in which Viet Cong troops were unnecessarily exposed in combat. Despite South Vietnamese and U.S. reports to the contrary, the estimates of Viet Cong killed are suspect. The glaring disparity between the numbers claimed dead and the weapons recovered seem to bear this out. It is felt that these battle estimates probably include a good number of civilian dead.

U.S. Tactics

The familiar pattern of economic aid, then military aid, followed by technicians, military advisers, pilots, and troops to guard U.S. facilities and personnel appears in Viet Nam. The culmination, which occurred in the spring of 1965, was the use of U.S. troops in the field.

Internal security problems were approached using techniques neither new nor very successful. The strategic hamlet idea was tried out by the French in 1953 in Indochina as well as by the British in Malaya. Essentially, it is a technique for cutting the local populace off from the resistance forces, thereby preventing terrorism, on the one hand, and aid and assistance, voluntary or otherwise, by the populace, on the other. The strategic hamlet is a heavily-fortified village. The methods are usually primitive using such things as bamboo abatis, and so forth. It was observed, a year after the initiation of the strategic hamlet program,

consequently character. There are two, it may, however, in which that kind of case would undoubtedly appear in some, which is about 1950 and U.S. reports on the contrary, the estimates of that time killed are somewhat. The disparity between the reports claimed and the weapons recovered seem to be this one. It is this that these data statistics probably include a good number of civilian data.

U.S. Tactics

The familiar pattern of economic aid, then military aid, followed by technical, military advisers, gifts, and troops to guard U.S. facilities and personnel appears in 1950. The colonialism, which occurred in the spring of 1951, was the one at U.S. troops in the field.

Internal security problems were handled using technical aid, but not very successfully. The strategic hamlet idea was tried and by the French in 1953 in Indochina as well as by the British in Malaya. Essentially, it is a technique for cutting the local population off from the economic factors, thereby preventing recruitment on the one hand, and the aid and assistance, voluntarily or otherwise, by the population, on the other. The strategic hamlet is a heavily fortified village. The methods are usually primitive using such things as barbed wire, and so forth. It was observed, a year after the initiation of the strategic hamlet program,

that there still reigned in Viet Nam

. . . a subtle feeling that the population has not yet really committed itself to the hamlet idea. Nothing is more important at present than the hamlet program Americans frankly acknowledge that they have few alternatives if it fails to cure our present ills.²²

But, the Americans did have an alternative, or at least a modification, called the Delta Plan. On March 22, 1962, Operation Sunshine set in motion the Delta Plan which literally moved the entire village into a prepared, fortified and usually more strategically defensible location. Militarily, the Delta Plan, so called from its location in the rich Mekong River delta area, was an improvement. From any other standpoint--agriculturally, socially, economically, and so forth--the Delta Plan has been a failure. Villagers simply did not want to be uprooted. Many were moved only at gunpoint. A scorched earth policy was followed in the old village site. Whatever else the Delta Plan did, it invoked even greater hardship upon an already beleaguered populace.

The classic hunt-and-kill operation, with thousands of troops sealing off an area, and then systematically mopping up, has been the mainstay of the Vietnamese and American forces. It is, more often than not, a frustrating and unproductive technique.

²²The New York Times, May 5, 1963.

and some still remain in the area.

"... a number of people have been
very easily convinced that the
situation is more serious than the
actual situation. . . . In fact, the
situation is not as serious as it
is often made out to be."
Source: [redacted]

For the Americans did have an alternative, on 21
July 1953, the American, called the Delta Plan. On March 22,
1953, Operation Mountain was in action the Delta Plan which
literally moved the entire village into a new, fortified
and usually more strategically defensible location. Mil-
lery, the Delta Plan, was called from the location in the
first North Vietnamese area, was an improvement. From any
other standpoint--agricultural, socially, economically,
and so forth--the Delta Plan was a failure. Villagers
simply did not want to be moved. Many were moved only at
gunpoint. A second Delta Plan was followed in the old
village area. However, the Delta Plan did, it moved
even greater numbers of people already displaced people.
The classic heart-and-soul operation, with thousands
of people being moved at once, and then systematically
moving up, but from the vicinity of the Vietnamese and
American forces. It is, more often than not, a frustrating
and wasteful business.

Source: The New York Times, May 2, 1953.

A new dimension was added to the war in Southeast Asia when the United States acknowledged on January 13, 1965, that two U.S. Air Force bombers had been shot down in a raid over Laos. The disclosure was the first public admission that U.S. forces were engaged in attacks on Communist supply lines outside South Viet Nam. The jets were reportedly participating in an air strike of more than twenty U.S. airplanes which destroyed a key Laotian bridge along the Communist supply route from North Viet Nam. On January 18, the same day that President Johnson made his Defense message to Congress, the Department of State declared that U.S. forces were assisting Laos to defend its neutrality and independence, as guaranteed by the 1962 Geneva Accord.²³

In February, 1965, another development was added to the war in Viet Nam. As a direct result of North Vietnamese torpedo boat attacks on U.S. naval vessels patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin and further attacks on U.S. installations in South Viet Nam, the United States commenced air attacks on North Viet Nam. The attacks were measured—increasing in magnitude and targetting as well as proximity to Hanoi.

This new dimension, called escalation, was first officially articulated in a White House news statement on

²³Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, p. 90.

A new document was added to the war in Southeast Asia when the United States announced on January 11, 1965, that the U.S. Air Force would now have a role over Laos. The document was the first public statement that U.S. forces were engaged in efforts to destroy that supply lines running from North Vietnam. The joint was reportedly participating in an air strike of such size during U.S. airplanes which destroyed a key Laotian bridge along the Communist supply route from North Vietnam. On January 10, the same day that President Johnson made his Defense message to Congress, the Department of State announced that U.S. forces were sending more to Laos in necessity for independence, as requested by the 1961 Geneva Accord.¹¹

In February, 1965, another development was added to the war in Laos. As a direct result of North Vietnamese requests sent against U.S. naval vessels patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin and further attacks on U.S. installations in North Vietnam, the United States announced its attack on North Vietnam. The attack was announced—according to magazines and newspapers as well as provision of funds. This new situation, called escalation, was first officially announced in a White House news conference on

¹¹ Departmental Circulars, Vol. XVII, No. 4, p. 50.

February 7, 1965, the day of the first air strike. Following a meeting of the National Security Council, the statement was released indicating that the air attacks had been "carefully limited to military areas" which "intelligence has shown to be actively used by Hanoi for training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet Nam." The statement emphasized that "we seek no wider war" but it added that "whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors." The Soviet Union had been fully informed of the limited nature and intent of the air strikes.²⁴

On the same day, President Johnson stated at a news conference regarding the evacuation of dependents from Saigon:

It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installation We have no choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Viet Nam.²⁵

Troop reinforcements were ordered into action that same day. In addition, U.S. Hawk missile units were ordered to South Viet Nam. The pattern of deeper and deeper military involvement was rapidly unfolding. The Secretary of

²⁴White House news statement, quoted in the Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 6, p. 259.

²⁵Ibid.

February 1, 1955, the day of the first air strike. Following a meeting of the National Security Council, the administration was released indicating that the air strikes had been "carefully limited to military targets" which "indicated that there was no active use of force for military purposes." The statement emphasized that the goal was to win war, but it added that "whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese government." The North Vietnamese had been fully informed of the limited nature and intent of the air strikes.¹⁵

On the same day, President Johnson stated at a news conference regarding the situation of Southeast Asia:

Belmont:

It has become clear that North Vietnam has embarked on a more aggressive course of action against South Vietnam. We have no intention of allowing this aggression to continue. We have no choice but to clear the North and end this aggression. We will continue our commitment to South Vietnam.

Mar. 11

Group statements were ordered into action that same day. In addition, U.S. Navy aircraft units were ordered to South Vietnam. The purpose of these and other military involvement was rapidly increasing. The necessity of

¹⁵ "White House news release," quoted in the Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 109.

Defense, at a press conference on the same day as the Viet Cong attack at Pleiku, called it:

. . . a clear challenge of the political purpose of both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Governments. . . . which we could not fail to respond to . . . without misleading the North Vietnamese as to our intent and the strength of our purpose to carry out that intent.²⁶

In the furor which followed the new policy, the term "escalation" was attached by Senator Mansfield in a sharply worded criticism of U.S. foreign policy.

The concept of escalation was formulated to dissuade the Hanoi Government from continuing the subversion, infiltration, and guerrilla warfare against South Viet Nam. It is true that the original intent of the air attacks was keyed to retaliation to North Vietnamese initiatives. However, the air attacks shortly assumed the higher strategic purpose of escalation. The United States made it clear that it was willing to cease the air attacks upon receipt of an indication that the North Vietnamese had desisted from their subversion of South Viet Nam.

During the House Armed Services Committee hearings from February 18-24, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara articulated the policy of the Johnson Administration regarding South Viet Nam. He pointed out that the stakes in Viet Nam are far greater than the mere loss of one small country

²⁶Ibid.

February 23 a press conference on the day after the

long debate at the State Department.

... a direct challenge of the political purposes of
both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese governments.
... which we would not fail to respond to ...
without abandoning the North Vietnamese as we did
instead and the strategy of our progress to carry out
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ever, the air strikes shortly assumed the higher strategic

purpose of escalation. The United States was in clear that

it was willing to cross the air strikes were viewed as an

indication that the North Vietnamese had decided to make

escalation of their war.

During the period 1961-1962, the Joint Committee on

Internal Security, 1961-1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara

articulated his policy as the Johnson Administration regard-

ing North Vietnam. He pointed out that the reason in Viet-

nam was that the United States was not a small country

to the control of Communist China. A Communist victory in South Viet Nam has wider significance than that. One of the most meaningful facts of international affairs today is the close inter-relation between the U.S.-Soviet detente and the Sino-Soviet rift. A Communist success in Viet Nam would be a signal vindication of the Chinese position in the dispute with Soviet Union for leadership in Asia. Carried further, a strengthening of the Chinese position vis-à-vis the smaller "third areas" of Asia could do nothing but diminish the U.S.-Soviet accord. McNamara stated:

Thus the choice is not simply whether to continue our efforts to keep South Viet Nam free and independent but, rather, whether to continue our struggle to halt Communist expansion in Asia. If the choice is the latter, as I believe it should be, we will be far better off facing the issue in South Viet Nam. The present situation in South Viet Nam is grave but by no means hopeless.²⁷

During early April, 1965, President Johnson made an offer of unconditional discussions which was summarily rejected by both the Peking and Hanoi governments:

Hanoi has clung to its demand--which Washington rejects--that any negotiations must have as their basis American withdrawal from Viet Nam. Peking has adamantly opposed any settlement short of total American capitulation.²⁸

²⁷ Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara, Statement before the United States Congress, House, Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and the 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965.

²⁸ The New York Times, May 23, 1965.

to the control of Communist China. A Communist victory in
1949 was not an event which should be taken as the
end of the world. It is an event which is the
beginning of a new era in the history of the
East. It is an event which is the beginning of a
new era in the history of the world.

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There are no doubt as yet single answers to questions on
effects of North Korea's first and independent
test, rather, answers to questions are emerging to help
determine responses in Asia. It has been in the
labor, as I believe it should be, as will be for
other AEC facing the issue in North Asia. The
current situation in North Asia is grave but by
no means hopeless.

other of unconditional disclosure which was essentially

Many have given in to temptation—often resulting in
 death—because they were not strong enough to resist the
 temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil.

On May 13, 1965, a new tactic was unveiled, called "the pause." It was a six-day cessation of air attacks, made on the initiative of the United States to see if the North Vietnamese could be brought to the conference table. This tactic was unsuccessful, and the air attacks were resumed on May 19 from bases in Thailand, South Viet Nam, and also from three U.S. aircraft carriers operating off Indochina.

The institution of the pause received considerable coverage and support in the U.S. as well as abroad, especially while it was in effect.²⁹ In retrospect, however, it is clear that it was simply a maneuver to quiet the more influential of the U.S. legislators; such as, Senator Fulbright, who voiced the desire for a cessation in the U.S. air strikes for the purpose of improving the climate for negotiations.

Ground action also increased in intensity. The U.S.-South Vietnamese tactic of hunt-and-kill has been streamlined with the incorporation of heliborne techniques. Quick penetrations are accomplished with the aid of troop-carrying helicopters escorted by helicopters armed with rockets and heavy automatic weapons. In late May, this technique yielded several moderately successful operations.

²⁹"Pause In Viet Nam," an editorial in The New York Times, May 16, 1965.

On May 11, 1963, a new tactic was unveiled, called "The Game." It was a six-day campaign of air attacks, made on the initiative of the United States to see if the North Vietnamese would be brought to the conference table. This tactic was unsuccessful, and the air attacks were now made on May 12, 1963 (see in Thailand, South Viet Nam, and with some other U.S. aircraft carriers operating off Indo-China).

The intention of the game was to force the North Vietnamese to accept the U.S. as well as South, especially while it was in effect. In fact, however, it is clear that it was simply a maneuver to push the North Vietnamese to the U.S. table; even so, however, this tactic, who joined the North for a campaign in the U.S. air strikes for the purpose of improving the climate for negotiations.

Ground action also increased in intensity. The U.S. South Vietnamese tactic of land-and-air has been streamlined with the incorporation of helicopter technology. Helicopters are now employed with the use of troop-carrying helicopters equipped by helicopters armed with rockets and heavy automatic weapons. In fact now, this tactic has yielded several noteworthy successful operations.

Times, May 16, 1963
 "From the New York Times, May 16, 1963"

Escalation, as a tactic, is not limited to air warfare. In perhaps a less spectacular way, U.S. troop involvement has been escalating in both magnitude and in the degree of participation in the fighting. In 1961, U.S. troops in Viet Nam totaled two thousand and functioned mainly in a security role, guarding U.S. personnel, materiel, and installations. The following troop totals show a significant escalation up to the date of this paper:³⁰

<u>Year</u>	<u>Troops</u>
1961	2,000
1962	11,000
1963	13,500
1964	23,000
1965 (May)	46,000
1965 (June)	70,000

The troop level figure which is now under discussion is 125,000 men and was confirmed in a White House news release August 4, 1965. This figure is reportedly the Defense Department objective for the foreseeable future. This statement is interesting when it is noted that, in March, General Taylor announced to Congress that the figure of 30,000 would be an outside top for the Vietnamese operation. On the very next day, a Pentagon news release announced a build-up to 40,000.³¹

³⁰ The New York Times, May 23, 1965.

³¹ "How Many Are Needed?," an editorial in The Washington Post, May 29, 1965.

consequently, as a building, is not limited to any one-
 area. The various areas represented by the group involve
 and has been resulting in some significant and in the degree
 of participation in the activity. In 1961, when people in
 West New Britain had no transport and functioned mainly in a
 security role, providing life, personnel, material, and dis-
 tribution. The following group holds that a significant
 association up to the date of this paper.¹⁰

Year	1961
1961	11,000
1962	11,000
1963	11,000
1964	11,000
1965	11,000
1966	11,000
1967	11,000
1968	11,000

The group level figure which is now under discussion
 is 11,000 and was contained in a letter from the
 United States, 1961. This figure is reported by
 United States officials for the 1961-1962 period.
 This estimate is being reported when it is noted that, in
 March, 1961, the United States announced that the figure
 of 10,000 would be no longer the case and the estimate up-
 dated. In the very next day, a letter from the United
 States announced a building of 10,000.¹¹

¹⁰The New York Times, May 11, 1961.

¹¹How many are needed? as indicated in the New
 York Post, May 10, 1961.

It is worth noting that the United States, at this moment, is far from equaling the French troop involvements in 1953. The two great equalizers, it is alleged, are American air power and the American soldier. While this writer is willing to acknowledge a possible, nay probable, superiority in fighting qualities of the present American fighting man over the French soldier of ten years ago, it is difficult to accept an order of magnitude of ten to one. Even at that, the French effort was a monumental failure.

Total French involvement, at the time of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, was 420,000 men. The United States, in its last ground commitment in Asia, the Korean War, was forced to put in over 327,000 troops before being able to force the Communist forces into accepting a cease-fire. Where numbers were not the controlling factor in the case of the French in Viet Nam, they were able to count for the United States in Korea. Based upon the present militant stand of the Johnson Administration in Southeast Asia, there is no reason to believe that U.S. troop involvement will not continue to escalate beyond that of Korea.

Estimates of the ultimate U.S. troop commitment in Viet Nam are as numerous as they are futile.³² However,

³² Murrey Marder, "U.S. Strategy in Viet War," The Washington Post, July 18, 1965. For example, Mr. Marder estimates a top figure of 150,000 to 200,000 men. This is somewhat higher than current Defense Department estimates.

It is worth noting that the United States, at this
 moment, is far from opening the French group investments
 in 1951. The two great operations, in its opinion, are
 American air power and the American soldier. While this
 latter is willing to acknowledge a possible, not probable,
 responsibility in fighting operations of the present Korean
 fighting was over the French soldiers of two years ago. It is
 difficult to accept an order of magnitude of two to one.
 Even at that, the French effort was a considerable failure.
 Total French involvement, at the end of the fall of
 1950 was 410,000 men. The United States, in the
 last ground commitment in Asia, the Korean War, was forced
 to put in over 1,000,000 troops before being able to force the
 Communist forces into accepting a cease-fire. When matters
 were not the controlling factor in the case of the French in
 Viet Nam, they were able to count on the United States in
 Korea. Based upon the current allied stand of the United
 States in Southeast Asia, there is no reason to
 believe that U.S. troop involvement will not continue to
 include support that of Korea.

Statistics of the Vietnam U.S. troop commitment in
 that war are as follows as they are available.¹⁰ However,

¹⁰ Source: "U.S. Troop Commitment in Viet Nam," The
 Congressional Budget Office, July 18, 1962. For example, in 1962
 the figure of 150,000 to 200,000 men. This is
 somewhat different from current Defense Department estimates.

there are some cold hard facts to be considered in the Vietnamese situation in relation to larger-scale and more conventional military operations as the North Vietnamese strategy advances into Stage Three. The North Vietnamese Army numbers over 400,000 regular troops.³³ The Hanoi government is in a position, if sufficiently supported by Communist Chinese supplies and equipment, successfully to commit this force to the field against the South Vietnamese and American troops in a more conventional military confrontation.

The strategy of escalation, implemented by the Johnson Administration, consists of two stages. Stage One, in this strategy, was the decision, carried out in February, 1965, to begin air strikes north of the 17th parallel. Stage Two is the build-up of U.S. troops in the newly-formulated role of active combat participation to a force in excess of 100,000 men. The decision to enter Stage Two, to commit U.S. forces as front-line fighters, is one of the more significant steps in the policy of escalation.³⁴

The Lessons of Viet Nam

Many lessons have been derived from the war in Viet

³³James Reston, "Unlimited Ends and Limited Means," The New York Times, June 6, 1965.

³⁴Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Stage Two in Viet Nam," The Washington Post, July 19, 1965.

Nam to date. Many more have yet to be learned. Nonetheless, one lesson is abundantly clear. The United States has a "stake" in Viet Nam. This stake is not whether the United States is capable of defeating 40,000 guerrillas with helicopters, weed-killing chemicals, napalm, or non-toxic gas; nor is the key problem whether the limited escalation tactic will work even when backed up with tactical nuclear weapons and launched against Hanoi. There need be no questioning whether or not the United States has the power to defeat the North Vietnamese forces. The real question is whether the United States and the West are still able to instill enough confidence in those humble Vietnamese who have put their trust in us, to make them stand up and fight for the common cause. If they do, it will only be because they are finally convinced that the defeat of the North Vietnamese government does not mean an unconditional return to the bondage of a morally and politically bankrupt leadership.³⁵

³⁵ Fall, op. cit., p. 335.

CHAPTER V

LIMITED WAR--CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR

No discussion of limited war would be complete without at least a mention of the question of the use of nuclear weapons. Probably the clearest statement made, of the feelings of a large segment of the American public regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons, was by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric in October, 1961:

I, for one, have never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nuclear bang.¹

The point is very clearly brought to the attention of all the writers of material on current nuclear strategy that one of the most significant facts about the limited nuclear war is that one has never been fought.² The tendency is for these analysts of nuclear strategy to attribute to society, in general, a degree of rationality during a nuclear holocaust which, so far, it has not demonstrated under conditions far less terrifying. Halperin's observation, above, becomes

¹Henry L. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," from Ralph Toledano (ed.), Conservative Papers (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).

²Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1963), p. 58.

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¹Henry L. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," from Ralph Tolstano (ed.), Conservative Papers (London City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1953).

²Robert H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 28.

all the more meaningful in that it renders many of the basic premises of the nuclear strategists purely conjectural.

As these analysts weigh all the possibilities and speculate on the form that nuclear war might take, nowhere do they take into consideration the effect of mass shock on a society and on people who govern--a subject of which physicians know little and physicists know less.³

The use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war, if not openly advocated, is at least included in its general consideration. Tactical nuclear weapons appear in the weapons inventories of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Their use has long ago been conceived, argued, and accepted in American military thinking. This acceptance, however, has not been without its opponents.

In the spring of 1959, a three-star admiral committed one of the most significant politico-military heresies yet confessed by a man in uniform. Vice-Admiral Brown, recent Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet stated:

I have no faith in the so-called controlled use of atomic weapons. I would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon, no matter how small, when both sides have the power to destroy the world.⁴

³S. L. A. Marshall, "Global Game Called Risk-Taking," The New York Times Book Review, May 30, 1965, p. 3. This argument was made in a book review of Herman Kahn; On Escalation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

⁴Hanson W. Baldwin, "Limited War," The Atlantic Monthly, June, 1959, p. 35. Admiral Brown's comments were

all the more meaningful in that it renders many of the basic

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¹ E. J. A. Mervin, "Global Arms Race: A Warning,"
The New York Times Book Review, May 30, 1955, p. 3. This
argument was made in a book review of Herman Kahn, On War-
fare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952).

² Hanson M. Baldwin, "Limited War," The Atlantic
Monthly, June, 1959, p. 35. Admiral Brown's comments were

The Admiral's comments voiced the thoughts of many other serious analysts of national security policy. These people feel that the thesis outlined in the writings of men like Henry Kissinger tend to over-simplify the problems of limited war. The general thesis of Kissinger's is that the United States must be able to fight and win nuclear wars. The superiority in size of Soviet ground forces at the time of publication of his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, prompted the formulation of the idea that a smaller U.S. force, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons could more than suffice in a confrontation with the Soviets. Unfortunately, the Soviets began a similar modernization of their ground forces. Roger Hillsman generally exploded Kissinger's thesis by stating:

There is nothing to indicate that a good, big atomic army would not be able to defeat a good little atomic army.⁵

The articulation of the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Secretary McNamara's statement (above) is reflected elsewhere in various policy statements of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations as well as in the

made at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C. shortly after he returned from a tour as Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

⁵Roger Hillsman, "On NATO Strategy," in American Defense Policy by Wesley Posvar (ed.), (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

The National Commission on the Strategic Arms
 Limitation Treaty (SALT) and other studies of national security policy. These
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Roger Williams, "On NATO Strategy," in American
Defense Policy by Wesley P. Reame (ed.), (Washington: Johns
 Hopkins Press, 1963).

general public acceptance of current national security policy. However, from a closer look at McNamara's statement, the serious reader draws a more subtle but meaningful inference. Although it is admittedly a somewhat speculative judgment, it is concluded that the tactical nuclear weapon has a limited value in the conduct of American foreign policy. The moral aspects associated with the use of nuclear weapons in a cause not directly linked to an immediate threat to U.S. national security are serious and completely unpredictable. The idea was best expressed at a time when the United States still possessed a significant degree of nuclear superiority. It is nonetheless applicable today.

What ties the hands of American policy aside from expediential calculations appears to be the morally crushing choice of using catastrophic and random means of destruction without a provocation or a threat of comparable dimensions.⁶

Nevertheless, both the Soviet Union and the United States are equipped with, and are prepared to use, tactical nuclear weapons in a limited encounter if the situation should demand such measures. What conditions will force this choice upon either antagonist, and what the results of such a decision will be, remain to be seen. It is abundantly

⁶Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), p. 115.

general public acceptance of current national security policy. However, from a clear look at the situation, the nation leader does a more subtle but necessary in-tervention. Although it is relatively a somewhat speculative judgment, it is concluded that the national nuclear weapon has a limited value in the context of American foreign policy. The social aspects associated with the use of nuclear weapons in a cause are directly linked to the state trust in U.S. national security and national and global responsibility. The issue was best expressed at a time when the United States will possess a significant degree of nuclear superiority. It is nonetheless applicable today.

What then the impact of American policy says from exponential calculations appears to be the mostly crushing choice of using strategic and random means of destruction without a provision of a threat of comparable dimensions.

Nevertheless, both the Soviet Union and the United States are equipped with, and are prepared to use, nuclear weapons in a limited encounter in the situation should demand such measures. What conditions will force this choice upon either antagonist, and what the results of such a decision will be, remain to be seen. It is absolutely

clear, however, that the likelihood of keeping a limited war limited, once the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been introduced, is vastly reduced.

This argument becomes more meaningful when viewed in the light of the following Soviet military statement:

It should be emphasized that, with the international relations existing under present-day conditions and the present level of development of military equipment, an armed conflict will inevitably develop into a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn into the conflict.⁷

It must be recalled that during the years 1945 through 1948, when the United States could supposedly have made the greatest use of the threat of nuclear attack, it failed to do so. The very enormity of the nuclear weapon prevented the United States from using it as a diplomatic instrument regardless of the monopoly it possessed. Soviet propaganda would not have enjoyed the success it did, had it not been for a vague feeling shared by most Americans. The belief existed that a local conflict, or one where the issues were of minor importance, was simply not amenable to solution by the threat of, or the use of, nuclear weapons.

⁷V. D. Sokolovsky, "The Soviet View of Modern War," in V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy (Moscow: 1962). Manuscript prepared by the Translation Services Branch, Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, pp. 164-250. Quoted in full in Posvar, op. cit., pp. 32-54. At the time this article was written, General Sokolovsky held the post of General Inspector, Group of General Inspectors, Ministry of Defense, USSR.

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W. D. Sokolovsky, "The Soviet View of Modern War," in V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), *Military Strategy* (Moscow, 1945).
 Statement prepared by the American-Soviet Strategic Studies
 Foreign Technology Division, Atomic Energy Commission, 1945, pp.
 104-105. Quoted in *The Soviet Union*, pp. 11-12. At
 the time this article was written, Sokolovsky held
 the post of General Inspector, Dept. of General Inspection,
 Ministry of Defense, USSR.

It was not Soviet Russia but rather the instinct of humanity which tacitly drew the correlation between the size of the war and the destructive power of the weapons employed. It is noteworthy that neither the victories of Mao Tse Tung, nor Marko's guerrilla campaign, nor the Prague coup, nor the Berlin blockade, nor even the Korean invasion, justified atomic retaliation. The horror inspired by the atomic weapon seemed to have paralyzed the United States as much as, or more than, the Soviet divisions massed on the borders of a Europe incapable of defending itself.⁸

The year 1949, as it heralded the end of the U.S. atomic monopoly, also ushered in a reappraisal of the use of atomic weapons by U.S. policymakers. The Korean War remained a limited war by a decision which was never fully confirmed but which determined the conduct of operation by both sides. The limitations concerned the number of belligerents, the theatre of operations, the weapons employed, and the aims of the combatants. The non-use of atomic weapons followed logically from this double limitation of the number of belligerents and the theatre of operations. Among other things, the Korean experience proved the possibility of a non-atomic war between major contestants in the atomic age.⁹

⁸Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958), pp. 25-26.

⁹Ibid., p. 32.

It was not until 1945 that the Institute of Humanities
 actually drew the distinction between the aims of the
 war and the destructive power of the weapons employed. It
 is noteworthy that neither the victors nor the vanquished
 have shown a possibility of doing so. The progress made, not the
 moral progress, has been the focus of attention. Justified
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² "Atomic War, in the United States, New York
 University Press, 1954, pp. 22-23.

With the rearmament of the West, following Korea, and the creation of the military strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a further change was noted in the prevalent theories concerning the employment of atomic weapons. The distinction was no longer drawn between a local war waged with conventional weapons and a general war waged with atomic weapons. Now the distinction was drawn between local wars waged with tactical nuclear weapons and a general war in which tactical nuclear weapons would be used in the land battles while strategic air forces struck far behind the front lines at the heart of the enemy territory.

Gradually, the tactical nuclear weapon found its way into U.S. military strategy as a substitute for large ground forces, especially on the European continent. The error of this line of thinking became apparent as the Soviets made similar technological refinements in atomic and nuclear weaponry.

It was at this time that a plethora of intricate and highly sophisticated concepts emerged concerning the theory of nuclear conflict. Phrases such as "graduated response," "massive retaliation," "second strike capability," "flexible response," and many others became commonplace.

Despite the proliferation of ideas on the refinement of nuclear warfare, they all contained a common denominator. These theories were predicated on the assumption that nuclear

with the command of the West, following Korea, and the creation of the military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a further change was noted in the present era, concerning the employment of atomic weapons. The distinction was no longer drawn between a local war waged with conventional weapons and a general war waged with atomic weapons. And the distinction was drawn between local wars waged with tactical nuclear weapons and a general war in which tactical nuclear weapons would be used in the last battle with strategic air forces. Behind the latter issue at the heart of the army's strategy. Generally, the tactical nuclear weapon found its way into U.S. military strategy as a substitute for large ground forces, especially on the European continent. The error of this line of thinking became apparent as the Soviet made similar technological advancements in atomic and nuclear weaponry.

It was at this time that a glimpse of intricacies and highly sophisticated concepts emerged concerning the theory of nuclear conflict. Various such as "graduated response," "massive retaliation," "second strike capability," "flexible response," and many others became commonplace.

During the proliferation of ideas on the existence of nuclear warfare, they all contained a common denominator. Three theories were predicated on the assumption that nuclear

warfare could be discriminating. Devices such as low-yield weapons, "clean bombs," military targetting and the term "tactical nuclear weapon" itself are all outgrowths of the idea, nay the conviction, that discrimination can be practiced by both sides in a war involving the use of nuclear weapons.

It is felt that, for several good reasons, discrimination in a nuclear exchange is impossible. First of all, discrimination is psychologically impossible to maintain. If the stakes are high, and they would have to be to involve nuclear weapons in the first place, there is little reason to believe that a nuclear-equipped power would choose defeat rather than resort to its "indiscriminate nuclear capabilities." As Raymond Aron has noted:

Extreme weapons imply extreme issues, and these in their turn preclude rational calculations in the conduct of operations.¹⁰

If discrimination is psychologically impossible, it is even more so technically impossible. The yield of a nuclear weapon aimed at a well-hardened enemy missile site would have to be considerable in order to be effective. As a result, the nuclear side-effects associated with such a detonation would probably reach adjacent non-military installations and personnel. In addition, the location of

¹⁰Ibid., p. 78.

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It is true that, for several good reasons, discrimination in a nuclear exchange is impossible. First of all, discrimination is psychologically impossible in nature. If the stakes are high, and they would have to be to involve nuclear weapons in the first place, there is little reason to believe that a nuclear-equipped power would choose to discriminate. Rather than resort to the "discriminate nuclear capability" idea, as beyond from the world.

Extreme weapons imply extreme intent, and there is their own practice rational calculations in the conduct of operations.¹⁰

If discrimination is psychologically impossible, it is even more so technically impossible. The yield of a nuclear weapon aimed at a well-known target would likely be would have to be considerable in order to be effective. As a result, the nuclear side-effect associated with such a detonation would probably reach adjacent non-military installations and personnel. In addition, the location of

suitable military targets, is quite often such that urban centers would inevitably be hit. Finally, it is worth noting that nearly all analyses of nuclear warfare take for granted that a nuclear missile, once fired, will achieve 100 per cent accuracy. Reliability estimates usually receive more consideration than accuracy figures. The painful fact is that if anything is predictable in weaponry (no matter how sophisticated) it is the fact that error will exist. Most terminal guidance systems are designed about the concept of detecting error and correcting for it, in a continuing sequence. It does not take a very high percent error, in a high-yield missile fired from a range of five thousand miles at a suburban military target to produce a miss distance which will effect the neighboring urban populace.

Finally, it has been pointed out to U.S. policymakers by many Europeans that nuclear discrimination is politically impractical. The use of only tactical nuclear weapons by the U.S. and the USSR might be a form of limited encounter from the standpoint of Washington and Moscow but certainly not for those countries which made up the battleground. Such a limited war fought in Europe would hardly seem limited to Paris and Berlin.¹¹

¹¹Klaus Knorr, "The Strained Alliance," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), NATO and American Security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 6-8.

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 centers would inevitably be hit. Finally, it is worth men-
 tioning that nearly all analyses of nuclear warfare take for
 granted that a nuclear missile, once fired, will survive 100
 per cent recovery. Realistically, however, missiles usually survive
 more consideration than recovery figures. The military fact
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 by many arguments that nuclear disarmament is politically
 impractical. The use of only tactical nuclear weapons by
 the U.S. and the USSR might be a more or less limited success
 from the viewpoint of Washington and Moscow but certainly
 not for those countries which make up the rest of the world.
 Such a limited war would in Europe would hardly seem
 limited to Paris and Berlin.¹¹

¹¹James K. Knox, "The Strategic Alliance," in Knox
 Knox (ed.), Into the Nuclear Age (Princeton, New
 Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 2-3.

It seems obvious, if one adopts a less analytical approach, that there are areas in the world where a limited nuclear exchange would be more likely to be kept limited than other areas (if such limitation is possible at all). From this observation the over-riding consideration emerges. What really counts in limiting war is the issue involved. If the issue, or the objective, is grave enough, the possibility of limiting the conflict over it diminishes to zero, all other considerations notwithstanding. For this reason, it is important for U.S. policymakers to determine, before the fact, which areas and which issues are not important enough to risk a general nuclear war over their defense. The tendency of the United States to equate any concession as "soft," or to establish all issues of conflict with its Communist opponents as equally important has been the greatest weakness of postwar foreign policy. Any policy which is largely motivated by a "Munich Syndrome" is, in fact, an abdication of politics for it is a denial of alternatives.

The policy of the United States toward the employment of tactical nuclear weapons is well summarized in a statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, in the spring of 1965:

Even in limited war situations, we should not preclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons, for no one can foresee how such situations might develop.

It seems obvious, it can be argued, that analytical approach, that there are areas in the world where a limited nuclear war would be more likely to be fought than elsewhere (if such limitation is possible at all). From this observation the even-odds conclusion emerges, that really counts in limited war is the issue involved. If the issue, or the objective, is great enough, the possibility of limiting the conflict over its dimensions is zero, and other considerations notwithstanding. For this reason, it is important for U.S. policymakers to determine, before the fact, which issues and which issues are not important enough to risk a general nuclear war over their defense. The tendency of the United States to equate any concession as "soft," or to establish all issues of conflict with its Communist opponents as equally important has been the greatest weakness of present foreign policy. Any policy which is largely motivated by a "winning syndrome" is, in fact, an abdication of policy for it is a denial of alternatives.

The policy of the United States toward the employment of tactical nuclear weapons is well summarized in a statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, in the spring of 1963:

Even in limited war situations, we should not preclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons, for we can foresee how such situations might develop.

But the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other means to cope with them.¹²

¹²Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, statement before the United States Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965, p. 74.

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1988 Defense Budget, February 15, 1988, p. 14.
Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1988-1989 Defense Program and
before the United States Congress, House, Armed Services
12 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, statement

CHAPTER VI

U.S. LIMITED WAR STRATEGY

Requirements

The present day existence of what is often called a nuclear stalemate has set the stage for a variety of forms of aggression, ranging from large-scale limited war to subversion in what are called "third areas."¹ U.S. strategy boils down to the maintenance of the politico-military environment, within which aggression by any state (if it must occur at all) shall be conducted within the previously discussed context of limited war. This means, then, a controlled political environment within which the necessity for keeping war limited is obvious and is, at least tacitly, acknowledged by all states capable of militarily expanding a conflict beyond these limits. The following principal elements appear to be obvious requirements for the U.S. contribution to this system:

1. An invulnerable, long-range missile force with a second strike capability. This means, the ability to

¹Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in The Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1963). This expression appears throughout his book and refers to areas which are neither U.S. territories nor those of our major allies, but rather those of our minor allies, neutrals, or perhaps even peripheral communist bloc areas.

U.S. LIMITED WAR STRATEGY

Background

The present day existence of what is often called a nuclear stalemate and the danger for a variety of forms of aggression, ranging from large-scale limited war to subversion in what are called "third areas."¹ U.S. strategy calls down to the maintenance of the politico-military environment, within which aggression by any state (it is must occur at all) shall be conducted within the previously discussed context of limited war. This means, then, a controlled politico-military environment within which the necessity for keeping war limited is obvious and is, at least tacitly, acknowledged by all states capable of militarily expending a conflict beyond these limits. The following principles are now expected to be obvious requirements for the U.S. contribution to this system:

1. An immediate, long-range missile force with a second strike capability. This means, the ability to

¹Worton B. Hargrove, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1957). This expression appears throughout his book and refers to areas which are neither U.S. territories nor those of our major allies, but rather those of our minor allies, neutrals, or perhaps even peripheral communist bloc areas.

inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy after having absorbed a surprise nuclear attack.

2. An effective system of alliances.

3. Procedures for ensuring the most effective use of the resources committed to the U.S. defense program.

4. An adequate, well-equipped, mobile force to cope with limited war.²

Missile Force. The current status of the U.S. long-range missile force indicates a marked superiority in the quantity of ICBM's.³

The "hard bases" of the Minutemen and the relative invulnerability of the Polaris missiles presently satisfy the requirements of reliability, readiness, and

²Maxwell D. Taylor, "Security Will Not Wait," Foreign Affairs, Volume 39, January, 1961, p. 177.

³Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, statement before the United States Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965 [hereafter cited as McNamara's Defense Statement]. Mr. McNamara's statement indicates that the 800 Minutemen and the 464 Polaris missiles constitute a significant superiority in total long-range deliverable mega-tonnage, pp. 45-56. President Johnson, in his "Defense Message," Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, pp. 114-117, listed the strength of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces on January 18, 1965, as: "More than 850 ICBM's, 300 Polaris missiles and 900 strategic bombers, half of which are on 15 minutes alert." He further stated that these forces are superior in number and quality than those of any other nation. The exact numbers differ somewhat between the two statements, although they were made within a month of each other. Both statements, however, agree in their declaration of a superiority of U.S. forces.

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achieved a decisive nuclear attack.

2. An effective system of alliances.

3. Procedures for ensuring the most effective use of

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² Maxwell D. Taylor, "Security Will Not Wait," Foreign Affairs, Volume 35, January, 1957, p. 114.

³ Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, statement before the United States Congress, House Armed Services Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965 (hereafter cited as McNamara's Defense Statement). Mr. McNamara's statement indicated that the 500 ICBMs and the 400 Polaris missiles constituted a significant superiority in total long-range deliverable warheads, pp. 33-34, Appendix 1, in his "Defense Message," Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 4, pp. 114-117, issued the strength of the Strategic Reliability Force on January 18, 1967, and "More than 810 ICBMs, 500 Polaris missiles and 500 strategic bombers, half of which are on 15 minute alert." He further stated that these forces are superior in number and quality than those of any other nation. The exact numbers differ somewhat between the two statements, although they are made within a month of each other. Both statements, however, agree in their declaration of a superiority of U.S. forces.

invulnerability. Efforts by the United States to develop an effective anti-missile defense system, currently represented by the Nike X, are so far unproductive.

Alliance System. Since World War II, U.S. policy-makers have recognized the global nature of its security interests and the consequent need for reliable and effective allies joined to the U.S. by common goals and interests. The idea of going it alone, as seems to have been attempted in the Viet Nam and Santo Domingo policies of the spring and summer of 1965, should be abandoned. An adequate security program, then, should have the collateral effect of strengthening U.S. alliances, reducing dissension, and enhancing mutual confidence. To achieve these results, U.S. commitments should be made only after careful study and consideration. But, once made, they must be unambiguous and credible. Commitments, to be credible, must reflect the military preparedness of the United States to respond quickly with the type of assistance necessary. The local defense strategy of the United States, especially in "third areas" must be dependent, to some degree, upon an effective indigenous force, capable of holding the line until the U.S. response can take effect. The self-confidence which this type of local defense force would engender in our allies would significantly enhance the value of the alliance. The primary purpose of the military aid program should, therefore, be

development. Efforts by the United States to develop an effective anti-missile defense system, currently recommended by the NSC, are no less imperative.

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oriented toward the creation of this local defense capability. The magnitude and form of such aid would vary with the strength and capabilities of the ally. It should be noted that considerable friction has been generated within the U.S. security alliance system over U.S. strategic bomber and missile installations. Allies having these strategic nuclear force installations on their soil are increasingly subject to Soviet threats. As a matter of policy, a continuing re-estimate should be conducted of all overseas U.S. bases as to their currency and contribution to U.S. strategic objectives. As the strategic mobility of U.S. limited war forces improves, in speed and capacity, the need for overseas establishments will diminish. U.S. policy on this point should be unambiguous and the withdrawal of forces should be undertaken as the increase in local defense capabilities permit. Presently, about 77 per cent of all U.S. military aid goes to eleven "third area" countries located on or near the periphery of the communist bloc who are confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of communist aggression--Viet Nam, Taiwan, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Laos, and the Philippine Islands--are, therefore, designated "forward defense areas." Total U.S. military and economic assistance will amount in fiscal 1966, to \$3,379,000,000. The amount spent on defense

attained, the question of this local defense cannot be left to the local authorities. The magnitude and kind of such aid would vary with the strength and capabilities of the ally. It should be noted that considerable friction has been generated within the U.S. security alliance system over U.S. strategic posture and missile installations. Allies having these weapons need not force installations on their soil and automatically subject to local forces. As a matter of policy, a non-aligning alliance should be conducted at all times. U.S. bases as to their currency and conditions to U.S. strategic objectives. As the strategic security of U.S. allies was forced, however, in speed and capacity, the need for overseas establishments will diminish. U.S. policy on this point should be unambiguous and the withdrawal of forces should be undertaken as the interest in local defense capabilities permit. Presently, about 75 per cent of all U.S. military aid goes to eleven "third area" countries located on or near the periphery of the communist bloc who are non-aligned directly or indirectly with the threat of communist aggression—Viet Nam, Taiwan, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Laos, and the Philippines. Indonesia, Cambodia, designated "forward defense areas." Total U.S. military and economic assistance will amount to about \$4,300,000,000. The amount spent on defense

by the United States, of over \$50,000,000,000, could well be ineffective without foreign aid.⁴

A Realistic Defense Organization. On January 30, 1961, President Kennedy, in his State of the Union message signaled a change in the overall approach to U.S. defense by instructing the new Defense Secretary

. . . to reappraise our entire defense strategy--our ability to fulfill our commitments--the effectiveness, vulnerability and dispersal of our strategic bases, forces and warning systems--the efficiency and economy of our operation and organization--the elimination of obsolete bases and installations--and the adequacy, modernization and mobility of our present conventional and nuclear forces and weapons systems in the light of present and future dangers.⁵

The deadline for preliminary conclusions was set as February 28. A further charge by the President to the Secretary of Defense asked for the development of a force structure "necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined ceilings," and "at the lowest cost possible."⁶

In carrying out these instructions, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara accomplished, to a large extent,

⁴William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 317. The figures in Kaufmann, for 1964 have been updated by the writer to reflect the fiscal 1966 budget figures.

⁵John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message, January 30, 1961.

⁶Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

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⁴William M. Lawrence, The Defense Strategy (New
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⁵John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message, January
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changes, more in methodology than in structure, in the U.S. defense establishment. Concepts such as cost-effectiveness, techniques of computer analysis and civilian experts became permanent fixtures of the Defense Department. Efforts to bring a sense of method and order to the vast and diverse structure of the defense establishment began to bear fruit. The over-arching criterion of the real national security needs of the United States was applied with increasing, and often painful, effect. The end results, thus far achieved, have been a measurable increase in the capacity of the United States to deal with the type of situation which the present international environment presents. Among these is the signal improvement in the ability of the United States to fight limited wars.

Limited War Forces. The final element in the U.S. security equation is a mobile, well-equipped limited war force capable of force generation levels sufficient to respond appropriately across the full spectrum of possible enemy threats. This element is equally as important as the strategic missile force. The relative importance of this force will increase as the danger of a planned nuclear aggression by the Soviet Union recedes in the face of our visible readiness to retaliate in kind. The U.S. conventional war capability has been woefully inadequate when compared to the military commitments it faces. As recently

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as 1961, the Army's financial requirements for the modernization of its equipment was estimated at about \$3,000,000,000 a year for five years.⁷ The improvements in U.S. limited war forces made since 1962 have been significant. The number of combat-ready divisions since 1962 has increased by 45 per cent. The number of tactical air squadrons has increased 30 per cent; airlift capabilities have increased by 75 per cent; and ship construction and modernization have increased by 100 per cent. Operation Big Lift, conducted in 1964, demonstrated the ability to airlift one Army division from one continent to another and increased to seven, the number of U.S. divisions stationed in Europe. By 1967, U.S. airlift capabilities will have increased by 400 per cent under the present defense program.⁸

The increase in Special Forces requirements, within the limited war force superstructure, has significantly, as previously mentioned, been noted. This facet of the limited war capability of the United States was made in direct response to the demands of communist activity in the "third areas."

⁷Taylor, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

⁸Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 306-7.

As 1961, the Army's financial requirements for the maintenance of its equipment was estimated at about \$1,000,000,000 a year for five years.¹ The Department in U.S. limited the force size since 1961 have been significant. The number of combat-ready divisions since 1955 has increased by 40 per cent. The number of tactical air squadrons has increased 30 per cent; all air capabilities have increased by 75 per cent; and ship construction and maintenance have increased by 100 per cent. Operation of the U.S. Navy Division 1961, demonstrated the ability to shift one Army Division from one continent to another and increase to four, the number of U.S. divisions stationed in Europe. By 1967, U.S. military capabilities will have increased by 400 per cent under the present defense program.²

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¹ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

² Statement, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

Objectives

On February 18, 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara presented in 1966 Defense Budget and his 1966-1970 Defense Program to the House Armed Services Committee. The initial portion of his presentation was an over-view of the general international situation facing the defense planners as well as a statement of U.S. objectives. These are worth reviewing briefly in the light of the potential commitment of the U.S. limited war capabilities.

In a general assessment of the international situation, as it bears on military policies and programs, Mr. McNamara cited the change in Soviet leadership and the detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese People's Republic as significant highlights of the year. Of much greater significance, however, is the ". . . gradual relaxation of the previously rigid bi-polarization of world power, which has been gaining momentum in recent years."⁹

On the communist side, the absolute control of the Soviet Union has been successfully challenged, and now, not only Yugoslavia, but also mainland China, Albania and, to a lesser extent, other communist nations of Eastern Europe are following policies directed to their own interests. The cleavage between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic

⁹ McNamara's Defense Budget, op. cit., p. 13.

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In a general assessment of the international situation, as it bears on military policies and programs, McNamara cited the danger in Soviet leadership and the detection of a nuclear device by the Chinese people's Republic as significant highlights of the year. Of much lesser significance, however, is the fact that a gradual reduction in the military aid to the Republic of China is now being planned which has been planned previously in recent years.²

On the communist side, the absolute control of the Soviet Union has been successfully maintained, and now, not only Yugoslavia, but also Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania are, other communist nations of Eastern Europe are following policies directed to their own interests. The change between the East and the Chinese people's Republic

² McNamara's Defense Budget, pp. 211, 212.

is so basic and is so directly involved in the national interests of each country, that it is unlikely that the change in Soviet leadership will, by itself, open the way to a reconciliation. The achievement, by the Chinese People's Republic, of a nuclear capability will not improve Sino-Soviet relations.

The general U.S. objective, in the light of this continued U.S.-Soviet confrontation is

. . . to seek a world in which each nation is free to develop in its own way, unmolested by its neighbors, free of the fear of armed attack from the more powerful nations.¹⁰

U.S. aid, both military and economic, will be implemented to achieve this objective. More specifically, this rule can be applied to the different areas of the U.S. defense perimeter in different ways.

Southeast Asia. The North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese are putting into practice their theory that any government of an emerging nation can be toppled by externally supported, covert armed aggression, even when that government has the backing of U.S. economic and military assistance. As a matter of fact, South Viet Nam has been selected to prove this theory. The outcome will have grave effects upon similar peripheral areas and less stable nations outside the communist bloc. The U.S. policy objective,

¹⁰Ibid., p. 4.

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Southeast Asia. The North Vietnamese and the Commu-
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selected to prove this theory. The outcome will have grave
effects upon similar postulated areas and less so in the
time outside the communist area. The U.S. policy objective,

therefore, is to support, by whatever limited force is necessary, the legitimate government in South Viet Nam. The future of Laos is intimately tied into this struggle. U.S. policy, then, involves the continuation of support to the Laos government and to press for implementation of the Geneva Accords. U.S. military assistance and training help in Thailand continues. In addition to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, the United States also maintains logistic facilities in Thailand as vital support facilities in the capacity to support a limited war operation in Southeast Asia. U.S. support and assistance is oriented toward enabling the local governments to reach their internal defense goals and to demonstrate "that mutual defense undertakings cut both ways."¹¹

The Far East. The principal local defense commitment in the Far East, in terms of resources, is in Korea. The United States maintains two divisions and helps support nineteen Korean Army and Marine divisions. U.S. military and economic aid to Korea is one of the largest, although efforts are being sought to reduce it gradually as the local defense capability of the Republic of Korea improves.

U.S. policy towards Japan is to maintain the basically sound relationship which presently exists. U.S.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 12-13.

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military installations in Japan are vital to the stabilization of the Far East. The ability of the United States to implement its limited war capability still depends, to a large extent, upon forward staging facilities such as those in Japan. In Taiwan, the United States is supporting a large modern military force which is necessary if that island is to be defensible. Throughout the Far East, the presence of large and powerful United States forces provides an important stabilizing influence as well as clear evidence of U.S. willingness and capability to meet its mutual security commitments.¹²

South Asia. U.S. aid to India has provided a measure of constructive influence which was not so much in evidence prior to the Chinese attack in 1962. U.S. plans, over the next several years, include the provision of modest defense production assistance and technical assistance through a program of credit sales. This program is paralleled with efforts by the United States to reassure the Pakistan government that U.S. aid to India will not be at the expense of Pakistan's security to which the U.S. is committed by mutual security agreements.

Near East. The Near East presents the United States with a complicated situation of political instability and

¹²Ibid., p. 15.

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with a complicated situation of political instability and

uneven economic development. The U.S. objective in Iran is to help build up her military forces "to the point where they could insure internal security and provide at least an initial defense against a Soviet attack across their border."¹³ In the remainder of the Near East, the U.S. Military Assistance Program is confined to training, except in Jordan, where a small materiel program is maintained.

A principal U.S. objective in the Near East has long been to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute from escalating. Substantial Soviet bloc aid--both economic and military--into the area (mainly in Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Yemen) has made this objective most difficult. To avoid total dependence upon Soviet arms, the United States is pursuing a policy of selective arms sales, including Hawk missiles, to some Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The periodic military presence of U.S. forces in joint exercises and deployments in this area is calculated to demonstrate the U.S. determination and capability to support and assist in a limited war effort if required.¹⁴

Africa. United States security interests in Africa are mainly confined to Ethiopia and Morocco where communications facilities are located and Libya where the U.S.

¹³Ibid., pp. 17-18.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 18-19.

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maintains an air base. These facilities are of primary concern as they relate to the southern flank of NATO. This importance is reflected in major Soviet military assistance to Somalia and Algeria. Approximately half of the U.S. military assistance funds for Africa are allocated to Ethiopia with a small amount to Libya. Regarding the areas south of the Sahara, the U.S. aid program objective is to assist in the maintenance of internal security and governmental stability for a sufficiently long period of time to permit the developing nations to create the framework of an economic, political, and ideological structure.

Latin America. Even more fundamental than the lingering threat of communist infiltration and subversion is the complex problem of economic stagnation and political instability which still plagues major portions of Latin America. Without discussing each particular problem area, it can be generally stated that a significant improvement has been noted in the resolution of this fundamental problem since President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress.

The continued existence of a communist regime in Cuba poses a serious threat to the less stable countries of Latin-America. U.S. action through the machinery of the OAS has been effective. By September, 1964, all members, except Mexico, had severed relations with Cuba. OAS sanctions are making it more difficult for Cuba to dispense arms money and

maintain an air base. These facilities are of primary concern as they relate to the security of NATO. This importance is reflected in major Soviet military exercises to Central and Eastern Europe. Approximately half of the U.S. military assistance funds for Africa are allocated to Algeria with a small amount to Libya. Regarding the arms aspect of the transfer, the U.S. aid program objective is to assist in the maintenance of internal security and governmental stability for a sufficiently long period of time to permit the developing nations to create the framework of an economic, political, and ideological structure.

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propaganda in other Latin-American countries. The United States is continuing its efforts to isolate Cuba from the free world, thereby increasing the Soviet burden of support. A unified strike force is now permanently located in Florida for the express purpose of prosecuting a limited war against Cuba specifically or as a staging point for a limited war effort in other portions of Latin America.

Europe and the NATO Area. The current economic problems of the United Kingdom, the continuing difficulties in Cyprus, and the recurring dissidence of certain NATO allies should not obscure the fact that U.S. European policies since 1945 have been largely successful. The NATO allies are also the principal trading partners of the United States. Western Europe, therefore, constitutes a serious area of U.S. national interest. The basic objectives of the United States in Western Europe are to ensure the security of that area against communist aggression, to further its growth, and to promote its economic stability. On these essentials, the NATO partners do not disagree. The question of how to achieve these objectives is the bone of contention.

Two basic questions have plagued unity and cooperation of the NATO partners. They are the role of tactical nuclear weapons in a war in Europe and the role of the European NATO partners in the strategic nuclear mission. In the first case, the United States is now providing its

propaganda in other Latin-American countries. The United States is continuing its efforts to isolate Cuba from the free world, thereby increasing the Soviet burden of support. A unified action force is now being organized in Florida for the express purpose of prosecuting a limited war against Cuba specifically as a stepping point for a limited war effort in other portions of Latin America.

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European NATO partners with tactical nuclear weapons under U.S. control. The question of ownership and control is raised in the second case as well. The basic American policy is that the United States will not relinquish control of the "trigger" except under the guise of a single, coordinated chain of command. The fragmentation and compartmentation of NATO nuclear power which would result from any other arrangement would be dangerous.

There is no fixed timetable to the pursuit of an Allied nuclear force. Any final arrangement must support the basic U.S. policy of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Capabilities

The importance of the U.S. limited war capability was underscored by the Secretary of Defense on February 18, 1964.

While all of our military forces would be employed in a general war, it is primarily the limited war mission which shapes the size and character of the General Purpose Forces.¹⁵

The total commitment to free world security, assumed by the United States, coupled with the limited General Purpose Forces at their disposal, have forced upon U.S. defense

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 70.

European NATO partners with technical nuclear weapons under U.S. control. The question of ownership and control is raised in the second case as well. The basic American policy is that the United States will not relinquish control of the "trigger" except under the guise of a single, coordinated chain of command. The responsibility and coordination of NATO nuclear power which would result from any other arrangement would be dangerous.

There is no fixed timetable for the pursuit of an Allied nuclear force. Any final arrangement must respect the basic U.S. policy of the non-dissolution of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

The importance of the U.S. limited war capability was underscored by the Secretary of Defense on February 18, 1964.

While all of our military forces would be employed in a general war, it is primarily the limited war mission which shapes the size and character of the General Purpose Force.

The total commitment to these nuclear weapons, assumed by the United States, coupled with the limited general purpose forces at their disposal, have forced upon U.S. defense

planners the necessity of expanding limited war capabilities in three directions:

1. Advance deployment of forces to potential trouble areas.
2. Maintenance of a highly mobile force in the United States for rapid response anywhere in the world.
3. Pre-positioning of materiel and equipment in potential trouble areas and the rapid airlift of personnel from the United States as necessary.

Although in the first case, there are relatively large U.S. forces deployed abroad, both in Europe and the Pacific areas, there are obvious limits to this approach, quite aside from its adverse effect upon the balance of payments.

The second method requires adequate sea-lift and airlift capabilities, toward which the United States is working.

The third approach, somewhat of a synthesis of the first two, is the most achievable, given the present state of development of U.S. mobile forces.

The major objective of U.S. military policy since 1961 has been to strengthen the non-nuclear capabilities of the free world, particularly those of NATO. Concurrently, the United States has been increasing its tactical nuclear capabilities, particularly those in Europe. From 1961 to 1965, the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe was increased by 60 per cent.

planning the necessity of expanding limited war capabilities in these situations.

1. Advance deployment of forces to potential trouble spots.

2. Maintenance of a highly mobile force in the United States for rapid response anywhere in the world.

3. The positioning of selected air equipment in potential trouble areas and the rapid shift of personnel from the United States as necessary.

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The major objective of U.S. military policy since 1951 has been to strengthen the new-found capabilities of the three main, particularly those of NATO, communities. The United States has been increasing its tactical nuclear capabilities, particularly those in Europe. From 1951 to 1962, the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe was increased by 50 per cent.

The Army. Combat-ready divisions, as of February, 1965, totaled sixteen, reorganized from the pentomic to the ROAD configuration, giving them greater strength, fire-power and flexibility. All units have achieved a higher degree of mobility. Army aviation is expanded, strengthened, and highly modernized. The Army's special warfare capability has been increased from three to seven Special Forces Groups. The tactical nuclear capability has been increased by the substitution of a more mobile, longer-range missile system and improvement in nuclear artillery. The staying power of all combat forces has been increased and reserve components have been reorganized to expedite their augmentation.

The Navy. Considerable review has been given to the enhancement of the limited war capability of the Navy. The main problem areas are the Anti-Air-Warfare systems (AAW), the Anti-Submarine Warfare systems (ASW), and nuclear propulsion. The General Purpose Forces of the Navy include fifteen attack carrier weapons systems and nine Anti-Submarine Warfare weapons systems. The attack submarine forces number 104, of which 23 are nuclear powered. Multi-purpose surface vessels (with both AAW and ASW capabilities) number 263. Substantial increases in the amphibian assault and logistic support ships, in procurement and modernization, is under way. This effort is specifically designed to increase

The Army's modernization program, as of February, 1962, totaled sixteen, reorganized from the point of view of readiness, giving them greater strength, 1122-power and flexibility. All units have achieved a higher degree of mobility. Army aviation is expanded, strengthened, and highly motivated. The Army's special warfare capability has been increased from three to seven special forces groups. The special nuclear capability has been increased by the addition of a more mobile, longer-range missile system and improvement in nuclear artillery. The steady power of all combat forces has been increased and creative concepts have been recognized to exploit their capabilities.

The Navy's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has been given to the enhancement of the limited war capability of the Navy. The main program areas are the Anti-Air Warfare System (AAWS), the Anti-Submarine Warfare System (AWS), and nuclear propulsion. The general purpose forces of the Navy include fifteen attack carrier battle groups and nine Anti-Air Warfare battle groups. The attack submarine forces number 104, of which 23 are nuclear powered. Anti-submarine warfare vessels (with both air and sea capabilities) number 23. Substantial increases in the amphibious assault and logistic support ships, in command and control, is under way. This effort is specifically designed to increase

the mobility and response capabilities of the U.S. limited war forces.

The Marine Corps. A force level of three combat divisions and their air wings with a modernization program similar to that being implemented in the Navy air units and the Army ground forces. Emphasis is placed upon the role of the Marine Corps in conducting limited war.

The Air Force. A major expansion and modernization of the tactical general purpose forces has been going on since 1961. Improvements have been achieved in fire-power and effectiveness. A tactical fighter force of twenty-four air wings, a tactical bomber force of two squadrons, and a mixed group of counter-insurgency aircraft constitute the limited war forces of the Air Force. The new challenges which face the latter forces have left the question of the exact nature of aircraft, weapons, and tactics, generally open.

The expenditures for all General Purpose Forces for the fiscal year 1966 will total \$19,000,000,000 and constitutes a steadily increasing emphasis on the limited warfare capabilities of the U.S. armed forces.¹⁶

Having determined the requirements of our national security posture and having reviewed official statements of

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 74-122.

the mobility and response capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Air Force: A Lower Level of Force Commitment

Advances and their air wings with a modernization program similar to that being implemented in the Navy air wings and the Army ground forces. Emphasis is placed upon the role of the Marine Corps in conducting limited war.

The Air Force: A Major Expansion and Modernization

of the tactical nuclear program. Funds are being set aside since 1951. Improvements have been achieved in air power and effectiveness. A tactical fighter force of twenty-four air wings, a tactical bomber force of two squadrons, and a mixed group of counter-insurgency aircraft constitute the limited war forces of the Air Force. The new challenges which face the Armed Forces have led to the question of the exact nature of aircraft, weapons, and tactics, generally.

The expenditures for all General Purpose Forces for the fiscal year 1952 will reach \$19,000,000,000 and cover a steadily increasing emphasis on the limited war capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.¹⁸

Having outlined the components of the national security posture and having reviewed official statements of

our military capabilities, we are faced with an obvious question: does U.S. foreign policy satisfy the needs of U.S. national security, as postulated? Taken a step further: is the concept of limited war, as put forth in this paper, supported by current U.S. foreign policy? The answer to both questions is a categorical "no." In defending this blunt condemnation, three main points should be raised.

First, U.S. foreign policy has, in the past two or three years, taken on all the appearances of an intent to "go it alone" in international affairs. Three glaring examples of this intent are the joint Belgian-U.S. Congo airlift, the initiation of air strikes against North Viet Nam and the Dominican intervention. Disregarding the military correctness of the decisions involved in these three instances, they have all shared one common defect. They were, for all practical purposes, all undertaken with little or no serious effort made at prior consultation with our major allies. At a time when close Allied coordination is a definite requirement of its national security policy, the United States has succeeded in estranging its major allies to a greater extent than at any time since 1945 (excepting perhaps the Suez Crisis of 1956).

A second point worth considering is one which is slowly becoming painfully evident in Southeast Asia. Despite the formulae presented for maximizing U.S. national

one military capability, we are faced with an obvious question: how can we achieve policy stability in the face of U.S. national security, as postulated? (John A. King, February 1964, in the context of limited war, as put forth in this paper, supported by current U.S. foreign policy. The answer in both questions is a categorical "no." In defending this point, I am suggesting, these main points should be raised.

First, U.S. foreign policy has, in the past, been characterized by a lack of consistency in its approach to an issue. For example, in the case of the Congo, the U.S. has taken a position of non-interference, while in the case of North Vietnam, the initiation of an attack against North Vietnam and the resulting intervention. Involvement in the military operations of the Vietnam War involved in these three instances, they have all shared one common defect. They were, for all practical purposes, all undertaken with little or no serious effort made at prior consultation with our major allies. At a time when close allied cooperation is a self-evident requirement of the national security policy, the United States has succeeded in extending its major allies to a greater extent than at any time since 1945 (including perhaps the years 1945-1950).

A second point worth mentioning is one which is slowly becoming painfully evident in Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that the U.S. national

security, while at the same time minimizing the extent of U.S. troop deployment, one fact is abundantly clear. The concept of flexible response, while providing well-tailored measures at the lower end of the spectrum of limited war, must also be applicable at the upper end of the scale. Military analysts, as well as policymakers, have devoted a great deal of effort praising the qualities of flexible response in the areas of military assistance, advisers, Special Forces, and so forth. Unfortunately, a similar effort has not been made to enlighten the American people on the aspects of deep military involvement in a large-scale limited war situation. Should the Chinese People's Republic so dictate, it could involve the United States in a war of Korean dimensions or greater in Southeast Asia. The American people have not been conditioned for this aspect of flexible response. How the people will respond to the impending threat of massive U.S. troop commitment is one of the unknown quantities which is presently plaguing the Johnson Administration.

On a purely military plane, without regard for U.S. consensual approval, U.S. military power is greater, in a higher state of readiness, and better disposed than it has ever been on the eve of a possible major conflict.

The Seventh Fleet, the most powerful naval and marine

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As a purely military plan, without regard for U.S. congressional approval, U.S. military power is greater in a higher state of readiness, and better organized than it has ever been on the eve of a possible major conflict. The Seventh Fleet, the most powerful naval and amphibious

force afloat operates in the East and South China Seas out of bases in Taiwan and the Philippines. There are three Army Divisions in the Pacific, one in Hawaii, and two in Korea, as well as Airborne and Marine units on alert on Okinawa. The 5th and 13th Air Forces are on hand with extensive operating facilities in Japan, Guam, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

With massive supply and the pre-stocking of military equipment in forward areas, no appreciable time would be required to bring a considerable force to bear should a major conflict break out at any point along the periphery of mainland China. The Communist Chinese are well aware of both the proximity and the magnitude of this force.¹⁷

A final point deals with the limitation of war itself. Whereas the Korean War was, in many respects, a classic example of the limitation of war, Viet Nam is not. The policy of escalation constitutes a blank check for U.S. policymakers to exceed the various limitations of war in Southeast Asia. The United States has successively renounced such previous limitations as military targetting, air strikes beyond the 17th parallel, the combat presence of American troops, the direct participation by U.S. combat units in the

¹⁷ Roswell L. Gilpatric, "Will Vietnam Lead to World War III?," The New York Times Magazine, May 30, 1965, pp. 11 and 22.

These three operations in the East and South China Seas are of course in Taiwan and the Philippines. There are three Army Divisions in the Pacific, one in Hawaii, and two in Korea, as well as airborne and Marine units on ships at sea. The 22nd and 23rd Air Forces are on land with extensive operating facilities in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

With massive supply and the understanding of military equipment in forward areas, no appreciable time would be required to bring a considerable force to bear should a major conflict break out at any point along the periphery of the Pacific. The Commander in Chief will have at his disposal the resources and the equipment of the Pacific, and the resources of the United States.

A final point with the limitation of war is that the United States has many troops, a considerable number of the limitation of war, that war is not the policy of escalation. The United States has a policy of escalation as against the various limitations of war in the Pacific. The United States has successfully renounced such previous limitations as military superiority, air strikes beyond the 17th parallel, the command of the Pacific, the direct participation by U.S. command units in the Pacific, the direct participation by U.S. command units in the Pacific.

IV. Hawaii is a strategic, vital Western base of world war. The New York Times Magazine, May 30, 1965, pp. 11 and 12.

field and recently the renunciation of the concept of sanctuary.

These three points constitute a political departure from the previously-discussed formula for U.S. national security as well as from the concept of limited war as typified by Korea. Now, in 1965, at a time when the United States is far better equipped to fight a limited war, its policymakers are inexorably dealing themselves out of the game.

The major casualty in U.S. defense policy has been the failure of the United States to perceive the fact that limited war still requires limited ends; limited aims still require limited means; and no degree of technological sophistication in weaponry has yet altered this fact.

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CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

War, as conceived and conducted through the eighteenth century, was limited by definition. The political system within which statesmen used war caused conflicts to be limited simply in that they were implemented, ultimately, with the understanding that they would not disrupt the system itself. Marginal alterations, within the system, were sought and obtained, when other methods failed, by means of war. War, then, by its function, operated to maintain its political environment.

The industrialization of Europe exerted a profound influence on war during the nineteenth century. The vast increase in man's ability to destroy his fellow man provided the means whereby war could exceed its heretofore inherent limits.

Despite the exceptions to the general rule, such as the Religious Wars, the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, war, up to the twentieth century, was still normally limited and was conducted within the house rules of the European nation-state system. It was the threat to destroy this system which also destroyed the neat concept of limited war. No longer, after 1914, was it possible to lose a war and then "stay in the game." No longer

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Despite the exceptions to the general rule, such as the Religious Wars, the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, war, up to the twentieth century, was still normally limited and was conducted within the loose rules of the European nation-state system. It was the threat to destroy this system which also destroyed the concept of limited war. No longer, after 1914, was it possible to lose a war and then "play in the game." No longer

did the winners strive to keep the losers in the system. At about this time of revolutionary change, the United States emerged upon the political scene as an actor rather than as an observer.

The source of much of U.S. behavior in international politics stems purely from the particular moment in history when she stepped out from the wings. The United States had very little experience as a major power in the art of limited war within the classical European state system. In fact, the first major U.S. effort in war was to tip the balance in a struggle to destroy the system. The total war, which ensued in 1914, operated outside the limits of the system. It involved total effort, massive destruction, and its ends were blurred by ideological exhortations. America's second major effort was also a general war--more total in nearly every respect. Is it any wonder that, in 1945, the Americans had accrued a singular set of attitudes in the conduct of international politics?

Americans tend to be extremely sensitive to what other nations think of them. Americans look for quick and ready solutions--"rational solutions"--to problems of foreign policy. They conceive of war and stress as unusual and temporary aberrations from the normalcy of peace and prosperity. Americans scorn a "no win" policy and demand a total victory over any foe with the temerity to force the

did the winners strive to keep the losers in the system. At about this time of revolutionary change, the United States emerged upon the political scene as an actor rather than as an observer.

The United States of America is a nation in international politics that grew from the particular moment in history when she stepped out from the wings. The United States had very little experience as a major power in the mid or late 18th century within the classical European state system. In fact, the first major U.S. effort in war was to sign the balance in a struggle to destroy the system. The local war, which ended in 1763, opened outside the limits of the system. It involved total effort, massive destruction, and its ends were limited by ideological considerations. America's second major effort was also a general war—this time in nearly every respect. It is my wonder that, in 1793, the Americans had secured a singular set of attitudes in the conduct of international politics.

Americans found to be extremely sensitive to what other nations think of them. Americans look for quick and ready solutions—"rational solutions"—to problems of foreign policy. They conceive of war and peace as universal and temporary abstractions from the normalcy of peace and progress. Americans accept a "no win" policy and demand a total victory over any foe with the possibility to force the

United States to the point of war. When war comes, diplomacy and politics are summarily abandoned in the conviction that wars are purely military matters to be won not discussed. Unconditional surrender, to Americans, is a natural objective in any war. Such concepts as peace without victory, the Cold War, and protracted limited war are, to Americans, burdensome and exasperating. U.S. values are thought to be universal, and it properly follows that her opponents are either charlatans or simpletons.¹

What had been lost in the debris of World War II, apparently forever, was the elaborately structured state system which had made possible the more or less orderly conduct of international affairs. By 1945, there was no longer a carefully stratified international society of nation-states in which each knew its appropriate place, area of competence, and degree of deference. Instead there existed, at the power end of the scale, only Moscow and Washington, and all other states were relatively at, or near, the zero point of weakness. Anything like the historic process of conflict and adjustment was, in such an environment, impossible.²

¹William S. Livingston, "British Politics and American Policy," in M. D. Irish (ed.), World Pressures on American Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 75.

²Charles O. Lerche, The Cold War and After (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 6.

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¹William S. Livingston, "The American Political and American
Policy," in H. H. H. (ed.), World Perspectives on American
Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1964), p. 12.

²Charles O. Lumsden, The Cold War and After (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 2.

The very gradual realization of this fact by the Truman Administration determined, in a sense, the institutionalization of the Cold War by the fact of U.S. intervention in Korea. It is in this context also that the Korean Intervention can be considered not a victory but a success. The inability of the Administration to articulate its policy resulted in bitter recrimination and the repugnant after-taste of defeat and disillusion experienced by the American public. Korea was, in any event, a classic example of the deliberate limitation of the means and, for a time, the ends of war.

As soon as the major antagonists came to the sobering realization that a stalemate existed and that open warfare between them could result in frustration and disaster, but never victory, they set quietly about the business of finding the means of limiting the conflict. This meant, among other things, finding boundary lines within which the war could safely be conducted--that is, with the ultimate survival of both parties implicitly guaranteed. The "parameters of permissibility" have been observed by U.S. policymakers up to February, 1965, when the Johnson Doctrine added a new dimension to U.S. foreign policy. These parameters were scrupulously adhered to in such crises as Suez (1956),

The very gradual realization of this fact by the Truman Administration, however, is a pity. The intervention of the Cold War by the end of 1945, however, then in force. It is in this context also that the Korean intervention can be considered not a victory but a success. The inability of the Administration to articulate its policy resulted in bitter recrimination and the subsequent state of defeat and disillusion experienced by the American public. Korea was, in any event, a classic example of the deliberate limitation of the means and, for a time, the ends of war.

As soon as the major antagonists came to the subject of realization that a stalemate existed and that open warfare between them would result in frustration and disaster, but never victory, they not only sought the means of this but the means of leading the conflict. This meant, among other things, finding boundaries lines within which the war could safely be conducted—that is, when the ultimate goal of both parties implicitly remained. The "game" of "containment" was then played by U.S. policymakers up to February, 1952, when the Korean conflict added a new dimension to U.S. foreign policy. These policymakers were accordingly placed in both cases as seen (1952),

Berlin (1961), and Cuba (1962).³ In the context of the developing stalemate, the necessity of the limitation of war became evident.

In the later years of the Cold War (since about 1958), the hostile dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union became a conversation as a third, unaligned, world demanded and received a hearing from both sides.⁴ It is in the light of this emerging international system of diffused power that U.S. policymakers grew to accept the concept of limited war as an instrument for achieving their long-range objectives by engaging the enemy locally in conflicts, often exasperating, usually protracted, and nearly always devoid of aspects of immediate victory.

The conflict in Viet Nam in the spring of 1965 illustrates the latest form in which the concept of limited war has evolved as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

The accepted rules, which have come into existence from usage and the lack of any contradiction, have unfortunately favored the aggressor. These rules, as observed by the United States, Soviet Russia, and the Chinese People's Republic have permitted an aggressor to conduct undeclared military operations against another state by proxy, as in the case of the Communist Chinese in Korea. These rules of

³Ibid., pp. 135-136.

⁴Ibid., p. 9.

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military operations against another state by proxy, as in
the case of the Communist Chinese in Korea. These rules of

limited war precluded any counter-measures that reached into the sanctuary from which the aggression was supplied and directed.

These rules, in Viet Nam in 1964, permitted the North Viet Nam government to establish subversive forces in South Viet Nam for the purpose of over-throwing that government. Up to the events in the Tonkin Gulf in early 1965, the Hanoi government was able to maintain full control of the degree of aggression, the magnitude of risk, and the possible consequences. They were thus able to establish and maintain the level of hostilities which best suited them. The Hanoi government was also able to increase or decrease the level of activity and tension to suit the external reaction to, and the effect of, the conflict. The maximum cost, to the Hanoi government, of failure could be established by placing a limit upon the amount of men and materiel involved. Should the element of risk exceed the expected gains, the North Vietnamese could simply wait, to try later at a more propitious moment.

The victim of this kind of aggression, according to these rules, was limited to a response, not to exceed the magnitude of the aggressor's initiative. The possible gains for the aggressor, then, are virtually unlimited, whereas those of the victim amount to nothing more than successful resistance. On the other hand, the possible price facing

India was presented my counter-argument that we had also the security force which the Government was supposed to maintain.

Then again, in 1947, after the war, the Government was supposed to establish a separate force in India. But for the purpose of our-organizing that Government, it is the fact in the India that in early 1947, the Government was not so organized. It was not at the time of independence, the majority of the people of India were not so organized. They were not so organized and trained. The level of education which they had reached. The Government was also not so organized or trained. The level of activity and action in the national movement, and the effect of the conflict. The national movement, in the national movement, we believe could be established by giving a limit upon the amount of our national involvement.

Should the amount of the national movement be limited, the national movement could easily rise, so that it could be a more organized movement.

The view of this kind of organization, according to the Government, was limited to a response, not to demand the magnitude of the Government's initiative. The possible point for the Government, that, we strongly believed, whereas those of the Government were in fact more than successful resistance. In the other hand, the possible point being

the aggressor was the sum total of men and equipment invested in the venture while the possible cost to the victim was unlimited.

Under these rules, there was a tremendous inducement to Communist aggression. It constituted the safest conceivable type of war for a potential aggressor--everything to win, and very little to lose. The attacker hazarded nothing more than the possibility of failure of an attack. The victim could achieve nothing more than the repulsion of the attack with a minimum of damage sustained.

This pattern was fundamentally altered by events in the Tonkin Gulf. The West initially gave tacit approval of this change of tactics undertaken by the United States. The balance, which bulked so heavily in favor of the aggressor, has been altered. The threat of reprisal across national borders has raised the risk to the aggressor as well as the attainable goals of the victim. The revision of the rules of this undeclared type of war is currently in progress. The precise nature of the change is still unclear. Even more unclear, and a little frightening, is the question of whether there is any more plan and order to this change than a mere ad hoc and haphazard gamble on the part of U.S. policymakers. One thing that is abundantly clear, however, is the fact that a complete reappraisal of the nature of this kind of war and its consequences is in order.

was advised.

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the operator was the son total by man and equipment in-

the 1950s with a system of loose controls. The state would achieve nothing more than the regulation of national work than the possibility of failure of an attack to run, not very little to lose. The speaker insisted on a radical type of war for a national approach--everything in Communist aggression. He concluded the speech with a final brief, there was a tremendous imbalance.

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[illegible]

It is felt that this revision does not alter the nature of true wars of liberation. Spontaneous and unsponsored revolutionary movements within the boundaries of a nation are not affected. The rebel and national forces, in such cases, will resolve their differences in the sort of protracted guerrilla activity whose rules and accepted conduct are familiar. However, the proxy-type of subversive conflicts across national boundaries have been permanently altered by the United States and by their tacit acceptance, thus far, by the governments of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.

The subtle implication of this change is not lost upon potential proponents of this type of war, especially in Southeast Asia, where the conditions, heretofore, were so ripe. The security and sanctuary from which aggression can be safely launched is no longer guaranteed. The risks, in general, of external subversion, disguised as a civil war of liberation, have greatly increased.

The situation which is now being presented to potential Southeast Asian communist aggressors, by the United States, appears to be so designed to make the risk-gain equation no longer profitable for this type of aggression. On the other hand, careful efforts by the Johnson Administration to keep the conflict as low as possible and to marshal official and public consensus indicates a signal change in U.S. attitudes toward the whole concept of limited

It is fair to say that this evolution does not affect the nature of the area of international organization and organization of a world revolutionary movement within the boundaries of a nation are not affected. The rebel and national forces, in such cases, will receive their differences in the world of protected political activity whose rules and standards cannot be familiar. However, the type-type of revolutionary conflict across national boundaries have been permanently altered by the United States and by their allies and associates, by the governments of Japan, China, and Moscow. The explicit implication of this change is not lost upon potential proponents of this type of war, especially in Southeast Asia, where the conditions, particularly, were so ripe. The security and security from which aggression can be safely launched is no longer guaranteed. The risks, in general, of external intervention, disguised as a civil war or liberation, have greatly increased.

The situation which is now being presented to potential Southeast Asian communist aggressors, by the United States, appears to be as designed to make this type of aggression no longer profitable for this type of aggression. On the other hand, external efforts by the Johnson Administration to keep the conflict as low as possible and to maintain political and public consensus indicates a signal change in U.S. attitudes toward the whole concept of limited

war in American foreign policy. The limited but measured acceleration of U.S. response in Viet Nam is rapidly creating the conditions within which a decision must be reached. Sufficient and unambiguous avenues for escape have been created for the aggressors. Similar avenues for U.S. policymakers do not exist.⁵ The present U.S. policy in Viet Nam appears to be postulated upon a "must win" premise. If so, this appears to be an effort to remove the concept of limited war from the realm of politics.

Basically, the strategy of escalation has departed from the entire concept of limited war as it was crystallized in Korea. The tailoring of means to ends, which typified the Korean conflict no longer exists. U.S. policy in Viet Nam is attempting to marry limited ends to means which, although they may not be unlimited, can best be described as "having no price tag."

The aim of the Johnson Administration appears to be a limited one, intended to push the Viet Cong forces back into a small-scale guerrilla activity as the basis for a negotiated settlement. The aim, it appears, is not to "win the war" in the sense to which Americans had become accustomed prior to 1950.⁶ If it becomes apparent that this aim is not

⁵Editorial in The Washington Post, February 17, 1965.

⁶Howard Margolis, "U.S. Strategy in Viet War," The Washington Post, July 18, 1965.

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² Editorial in The Washington Post, February 17, 1955.
⁶ "United Nations," U.S. Strategy in this war, The
Washington Post, July 12, 1953.

achievable under current U.S. policy in Viet Nam, the Johnson Administration will be faced with a grave decision.

Viet Nam—And the Future. A paper such as this, dealing with the role of limited war, inevitably leads to the consideration of what direction U.S. foreign policy should and must take in its most serious test--Southeast Asia. It is also inevitable that an analysis of events so recent and still unfolding leads the writer inescapably into the risky and unrewarding realm of prediction and conjecture. This risk is accepted, albeit reluctantly, in the belief that any analysis is valueless unless it postulates, tacitly or explicitly, an indication of where current U.S. policy is likely to lead.

It will be remembered that the continuing nature of the subject matter of this paper demanded the selection of a cut-off date beyond which scholarly research became unwarranted and ill advised. This date was that of the articulation of the U.S. policy of escalation which coincided with the initiation of air strikes against North Viet Nam on February 7, 1965. This limit has been adhered to. However, events which have occurred after that date and which are of sufficient significance to support the general thesis of this paper are herein referred to.

It is clear to most reasonable observers that a complete military victory by the U.S., although theoretically

[illegible]

attainable, is, in fact, achievable only at a cost far in excess of the requirements of American national interests. At the same time, it is clear that neither unlimited expansion of U.S. military involvement, on the one hand, nor complete withdrawal, on the other, are acceptable alternatives in the pursuit of those interests. The obvious course lies somewhere in the middle.

It is an obvious fact that the alternative of unlimited, or unchecked, escalation must, at some point, involve a direct military confrontation with the Chinese People's Republic. It is an equally obvious fact that the alternative of complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be an abdication by the United States of its responsibility as a great power as well as of its national interests.

The most striking characteristic of a great nation is not the mere possession of power but rather the way in which that power is exercised. A great power exercises its strength with wisdom, restraint, and with a constant awareness of the overall view of its role in world affairs. A lesser power exercises its strength recklessly, parochially, and irresponsibly. There is ample evidence, of a lesser power, in our own Atlantic Community, the exercise of whose newly-regained strength is often directed out of personal pique rather than from a mature estimate of its role in world affairs.

...in fact, achieve only a small part of the
 success of the rapid growth of American national interests.
 At the same time, it is clear that neither unlimited expansion
 of U.S. military involvement, on the one hand, nor
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 world affairs.

Limited war, by definition, requires the explicit definition of the various parameters of permissibility. Its results are neither victory nor defeat, but rather a negotiated settlement which constitutes a limited achievement for both sides within the framework of the status quo ante. This is to say that neither the Chinese nor the United States may suffer a disastrous loss of influence in Southeast Asia. If, then, U.S. policy is to follow a logical application of the concept of limited war, it must continue to be one of determination to end the war at the earliest possible time by a negotiated settlement involving major concessions by both sides.

The coming of the monsoon season in Southeast Asia, though not nearly as apocalyptic an event as it is claimed to be, brings the war in Viet Nam into a new phase. This phase is going badly for the United States. Cost, in terms of supplies, troop commitment, and casualties, is mounting steadily. Paralleling this increase in U.S. involvement is the increase of bitterness, frustration, and criticism engendered at home and abroad towards U.S. foreign policy. U.S. leadership, under these pressures, has been consistent and reasonably steadfast.

Throughout this increasing involvement, a continuous effort has been underway to seek a settlement. In 1964 and 1965, the United States responded favorably to proposals for

1955, the United States responded favorably to proposals for effort has been underway to seek a settlement. In 1954 and throughout this increasing involvement, a continuous U.S. leadership, under these programs, has been consistent. expanded as home and abroad towards U.S. foreign policy. the increase of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral. Specifically, this increase in U.S. involvement is of supplies, troop commitment, and assistance, is wanting phase is going badly for the United States. Civil, in terms to us, brings the way in Viet Nam into a new phase. This though not nearly as apocalyptic an event as it is claimed. The timing of the Korean season in Southeast Asia, circumstances by both sides.

conferences on the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia, hoping that such meetings would provide occasion for informal discussions with the Chinese People's Republic on Viet Nam.

In April, 1965, the United States accepted the proposal by Secretary-General U Thant to visit Peking and Hanoi for talks on Viet Nam.

On February 20, 1965, the United Kingdom, encouraged by the United States, proposed that the U.K. and the USSR act as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to seek a Viet Nam settlement with all the Geneva signatories.

On April 7, President Johnson stated explicitly that the United States was prepared to enter unconditional discussions for the termination of the war in Viet Nam. On April 8, in reply to an appeal by seventeen non-aligned nations, the United States repeated this same proposal.

From the 13th through the 17th of May, the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission in Viet Nam went to Hanoi to discuss the North Vietnamese reaction to "the pause" in bombing.

To all these efforts, the Peking and Hanoi governments have been implacably hostile. It is clear from this lack of response that the two governments foresee a complete Communist victory in Viet Nam. This realization poses two major goals for U.S. foreign policy:

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To all these efforts, the Peking and Hanoi governments have been unhelpfully hostile. It is clear from this lack of response that the two governments foresee a complete breakdown already in Viet Nam. This realization poses two major goals for U.S. foreign policy:

1. The continuance of support to the South Vietnamese military effort to such an extent as to preclude the possibility of a North Vietnamese victory.

2. The maintenance of communication with the Peking and Hanoi governments to keep open avenues for negotiation.

We have seen in recent years that nationalism is a far more potent force than Communism. We have noted in Vietnamese history a continuing struggle against external suppression. A central core of this struggle has been the resistance to Chinese domination. Even a cursory study of the basic socio-political structure of Viet Nam reveals values which are ultimately antithetical to Communist principles. Though the ultimate form of a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam is unpredictable, with the above factors in mind, it is not too difficult to envision a unified and neutralized Viet Nam with the United States and the Soviet Union as co-guarantors against Communist Chinese territorial encroachments.

U.S. military policy today, in its total involvement, presents somewhat of a paradox. Despite the recent build-up in limited war capabilities, U.S. commitments far exceed its capacity. The reduction in the 1966 military budget over that of 1965, although small, is significant. The Secretary of Defense ably explains this reduction as the reflection of an increase in efficiency and the culmination of a build-up,

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rather than an indication of a decrease of real military capacity. Although this argument is persuasive and abundantly accompanied by data, it is not entirely convincing. The answer lies more in the general political requirements of the Johnson Administration. The commitment of the United States to domestic problems, as well as a subtle effort to respond to a similar decrease in Soviet military outlay, are the two important factors supported by such a budgetary decrease. It is significant enough to note that the last two years have reflected the first absolute decrease in over ten years. Considering, in addition, the rapidly rising costs of weapons technology, as well as the current burgeoning of communist subversion in Southeast Asia, the budgetary trend takes on meaning. Certainly, it is not an effort to broaden the alternatives open to U.S. policymakers.

Insufficient material is available to support an extensive analysis of the change in the conduct of U.S. policy in Viet Nam. However, it is abundantly clear that a limited war is in progress, that it is expanding, and that the major parties to the conflict, the United States and the Chinese People's Republic (by proxy), are nuclear equipped. There should be no misunderstanding. As of this date, the Communist Chinese have exploded their second nuclear device--this last one a free-fall explosion. This is the next logical step to an operational bomb. Contrary to popular belief,

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 step to an operational level. Contrary to popular belief,

the so-called tactical nuclear weapon is not necessarily the ultimate in sophistication. A small tactical fighter, equipped with a low-yield nuclear device, even a primitive one, is a prime tactical nuclear weapons system that can easily be developed with hardware already available to the mainland Chinese. If the United States is unable to impose its wishes and achieve its objectives against the opposition of a conventionally-equipped Communist China, it will be even less successful against a China equipped with a tactical nuclear capability. If the Chinese were so equipped now, it is doubtful that the Johnson Administration would have taken the turn it did in February, 1965.

What, then, are some of the general conclusions that can be drawn?

A limited war can be fought by the United States with weapons ranging across the full spectrum available--from trench knives to mega-ton nuclear devices. The greater the destructive power of the means used, the less is its capacity for limitation in selectivity, destruction, or particularization.

A long-range missile force must be "at the ready," to set the stage for the limitation of war. However, it is not, by itself, sufficient in deterring all forms of aggression nor can it be applied in a limited conflict. In fact,

the no-deteriorated nuclear weapon is not necessarily the
 designed in sophistication. A small tactical airplane,
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a deterrent, to be effective, must, by definition, never be applied.

The requirement is, therefore, established for an effective second capability, that of deterring, and if necessary, of winning limited wars.

A full capability of deterrence implies moral, psychological, and political, as well as military means. Physical force, in the context of the present international situation, must be carefully tailored, in order to accomplish its purposes, to reasonable and limited objectives; and it must be applied thoughtfully and with restraint.

The key to the conduct of limited war as a useful tool of U.S. foreign policy is the realization that limited war can only be an effective tool in a truly limited issue. Generally speaking, these limited issues are found in areas and under circumstances of low priority to both antagonists. These areas, in which either opponent can afford the luxury of losing or withdrawing, are the only ones in which a limited war policy could or should be applied. These areas are growing fewer. The achievement by the Chinese People's Republic of a tactical nuclear delivery capability will summarily eliminate all of Southeast Asia as luxury areas for an American limited war policy.

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effectively without responsibility, loss of earnings, and is
occasionally of limited value.

and it must be applied judiciously and with restraint. Given its purpose, to a reasonable and limited objective; situated, must be carefully tailored, in order to provide physical force, in the context of the present international biological, and political, as well as military world. A full capability of detection and analysis, 27-

The key to the concept of limited war is a limited pool of U.S. foreign policy is the realization that limited war can only be an effective tool in a truly limited arena. Generally speaking, there should be no war in areas and under circumstances of low utility to both participants. There are, in which other options are available and the only one in which a

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